State of Utah v. Michael McNaughton and Brent Ziegleman : Brief of Appellant by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
1992
State of Utah v. Michael McNaughton and Brent
Ziegleman : Brief of Appellant
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
R. Paul Van Dam; Utah Attorney General; Attorneys for Plaintiff.
W. Andrew McCullough; McCullough, Jones and Ivins; Attorneys for Appellant.
This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, State of Utah v. Michael McNaughton and Brent Ziegleman, No. 920344 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1992).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1/3289
BRIEF 
UTAH 
DOCUMENT 
KFU 
50 
.A10 DOCKET NO. _£&&££££ 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH 
000O000 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
vs. 
MICHAEL MCNAUGHTON, 
Defendant, 
and 
BRENT ZIEGLEMAN, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
000O000 
Case No. 920344-CA 
Priority No. 11 
Interlocutory Appeal from Order of 
Fourth District Court of Juab County 
Hon. George E. Ballif 
W. Andrew McCullough (2170) 
McCullough, Jones & Ivins 
930 South State Street, Suite 10 
Orem, Utah 84058 
Attorneys for Appellant 
R. Paul Van Dam 
Utah Attorney General 
236 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
LF* 
K0V3 01992 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT. 
Page 
1 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, ORDINANCES, RULES 
AND REGULATION WHOSE INTERPRETATION IS DETERMINATIVE. . 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
POINT II. 
POINT III. 
POINT IV. 
THE OFFICER DID NOT HAVE REASONABLE 
SUSPICION TO BELIEVE DEFENDANT HAD 
COMMITTED A CRIME, AND THEREFORE THE 
TRAFFIC STOP WAS IMPROPER 
THE OFFICER WAS NOT JUSTIFIED IN DETAINING 
DEFENDANTS SUBSEQUENT TO THE INITIAL STOP AND 
INVESTIGATING MATTERS NOT RELATED TO THAT STOP 
ANY CONSENT GIVEN BY MR. ZIEGLEMAN WAS 
TAINTED BY AN ILLEGAL STOP AND AN ILLEGAL 
SEIZURE, AND WAS NOT A VALID INVOLUNTARY 
CONSENT TO SEARCH 
2 
4 
7 
19 
28 
THE ILLEGAL SEARCH AND SEIZURE MADE BY THE 
OFFICER DID VIOLATE A PROTECTED RIGHT AND 
A REASONABLE EXPECTATION OF PRIVACY IN 
DEFENDANTS 33 
CONCLUSION 38 
CASES CITED 
Page 
Crookston v. Fire Insurance Exchange, 817 P.2d 789 
(Utah 1991) 9 
Sims v. Utah State Tax Commission, 198 Utah Adv. Rep. 
5 (Utah 1992) 32 
State v. Arroyo- 796 P.2d 684 (Utah 1990) 18,29,30 
State v. Carpena, 714 P. 2d 674 (Utah 1986) 14 
State v. Constantino. 732 P.2d 125 (Utah 1987) 34-35 
State v. Godina-Lunaf 826 P.2d 652 (Utah App. 1992). . . 25,30 
State v. Larocco, 794 P.2d 460 (Utah 1990) 31 
State v. Lopez. 831 P. 2d 1040 (Utah App. 1992) 2,8,33 
State v. Mendoza. 748 P.2d 181 (Utah 1987) 16 
State v. Robinson. 797 P.2d 431 (Utah App. 1990) . 23,25,34,36 
State v. Sepulveda. 198 Utah Adv. Rep. 69 
(Utah App. 1992) 33,35-37 
State v. Sierra. 754 P.2d 972 (Utah App. 1988) . . .14-16,23,29-30 
State v. Steward. 806 P. 2d 213 (Utah App. 1991) 18 
State v. Swaniaan. 699 P. 2d 718 (Utah 1985) 13 
State v. Sykesf 198 Utah Adv. Rep. 35 (Utah App. 1992) . 8 
State v. Talbot, 792 P. 2d 489 (Utah App. 1990) 17 
State v. Tavlor. 169 Utah Adv. Rep. 62 33-37 
Sandy City v. Thorsnessr 778 P.2d 1011 (Utah App. 1989). 17 
State v. Truiillo. 739 P.2d 85 (Utah App. 1987). . . . . 14 
United States v. Carsonf 793 F.2d 1141, (10th Cir. 1986) 
cert denied, 479 U.S. 914 (U.S. 1986) 29-30 
Cases Cited Cont'd. Page 
United States v. Guzman, 864 F.2d 1512 (10th Cir. 1988). 23,27 
United States v. Walker. 933 F.2d 812 (10th Cir. 1991); 
Rehearing Denied, 941 F.2d 1086; Cert. Denied 
112 S.Ct. 1168 (1992) 26 
Utah Department of Administrative Services v. 
Public Service Commission, 658 P.2d 601 (Utah 1983). . . 9 
Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 83 S. Ct. 407, 
9 L. Ed. 2d 441 (1963) 30 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS CITED 
Page 
Amendment IV to the Constitution of the United 
States of America 2 
Amendment XIV § 1 to the Constitution of the United 
States of America 3 
Article I, Section 14 of the Constitution of Utah 3 
STATUTES CITED 
Page 
§ 58-37-8(l)(a)(iv) U.C.A 4 
§ 77-7-15 U.C.A (1953) as amended 3,13 
§ 78-2a-3(2)(e) U.C.A. (1953) as amended 1 
,1)AH C 0 U R T 0 F APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH 
---oooOooo- - • • 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Plaintiff and Appellee 
vs, 
MICHAEL MCNAUGHTON, 
Defendant, 
and 
BRENT ZIEGLEMAN, 
Defendant and Appellant, 
-—oooOooo- — 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Case No. 920344-CA 
- -oooOooo™ 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
This is ,wi I , ..., -. i i 4- V lipfJK'.i I i ony rvimina 1 matter, 
involving the appeal or a decision of the Fourth District Court of 
Juab County not r. suppress evidence against Defendants which 
Defendants cl ad mec i • m i, => • >- *• / •- :| : • : r " it : : • f their constitutional 
rights. Jurisdiction o rr;lh cow " * • r,c-.=*r such an appea] is 
granted by k 78-2a-3 ( 2 j s .-; j \« .A. (1953) as amended. The rule of 
appellate |»roc:e<lijrr' qo\«; - * *..tory appeals is rule 5; and 
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permission to proceed with this appeal has been previously granted 
by this Court. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
The issues presented in this appeal are as follows: 
(a) Whether the Utah Highway Patrol Officer who stopped 
Defendants on Interstate 15 in Juab County had 
reasonable suspicion to believe the Defendants had 
committed a crime, and thus whether the traffic 
stop was proper. The Findings of Fact in such 
cases will not be disturbed unless those findings 
were "clearly erroneous". The Conclusions of Law 
made by the court, after examining the facts, are 
reviewed "under a correctness standard." See State 
v. Lopez
 r 831 P. 2d 1040 (Utah App. 1992) For 
further discussion of the standard of review in 
this case, see Point I of this brief. 
(b) Whether the Utah Highway Patrol Officer who stopped 
Defendants was justified in detaining them 
subsequent to the initial stop and investigating 
matters not related to that stop. See paragraph 
(a) above for discussion of the standard of review. 
(c) Whether any consent for a search of the vehicle Mr. 
Ziegleman was driving, given by Mr. Ziegleman, was 
tainted by an illegal stop and an illegal seizure; 
and therefore whether that consent was a valid and 
voluntary consent to search. See paragraph (a) 
above for discussion of the standard of review. 
(d) Whether the search of the vehicle driven by Mr. 
Ziegleman was a violation of a protected right and 
a reasonable expectation of privacy in Defendants. 
See paragraph (a) above for discussion of the 
standard of review. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, ORDINANCES, RULES 
AND REGULATION WHOSE INTERPRETATION IS DETERMINATIVE 
Amendment IV to the Constitution of the United States of 
America. 
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[Unreasonable searches and seizures.] 
The right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against 
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated 
and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, 
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly 
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or 
things to be seized. 
Amendment XIV § 1 to the Constitution of the United States of 
America. 
[Citizenship - Due process of law - Equal protection.] 
All persons born or naturalized in the United 
States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are 
citizens of the United States and of the State wherein 
they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law 
which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of 
citizens of the United States; nor shall any State 
deprive any person of life, liberty or property, without 
due process of law; nor deny to any person within its 
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. 
Article I § 14 of the Constitution of Utah: 
[Unreasonable searches forbidden — Issuance of 
warrant.] 
The right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable 
searches and seizures shall not be violated; and no 
warrant shall issue but upon probable cause supported by 
oath or affirmation, particularly describing the place to 
be searched, and the person or thing to be seized. 
§ 77-7-15 U.C.A. as amended 
Authority of peace officer to stop and question suspect -
Grounds. 
A peace officer may stop any person in a public 
place when he has a reasonable suspicion to believe he 
has committed or is in the act of committing or is 
attempting to commit a public offense and may demand his 
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name, address and an explanation of his actions. 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
This is an interlocutory appeal in a felony criminal matter. 
Defendant and Appellant is charged in a criminal Information filed 
in the Fourth District Court, Juab County, with a second degree 
felony of knowingly and intentionally possessing cocaine with 
intent to distribute, contrary to § 58-37-8(1)(a)(iv) U.C.A. 
Appellant Brent Ziegleman, and his Co-Defendant, Michael 
McNaughton, who has not joined in this interlocutory appeal, filed 
motions to suppress evidence, and Appellant filed a Memorandum in 
Support of that Motion. A hearing on the Motion to Suppress 
Evidence was held before Hon. George E. Ballif, on November 5, 
1991. By oirder of May 7, 1992, the Motion to Suppress Evidence was 
denied. A Petition for permission to file an interlocutory appeal 
was filed on May 29, 1992; and an order granting permission to file 
the interlocutory appeal was made by this Court on July 1, 1992. 
On the morning of July 20, 1991, Trooper Lance Bushnell, of 
the Utah Highway Patrol was southbound, just south of Nephi, Juab 
County, on Interstate 15 (T.7). He observed a vehicle traveling 
north, across the median, and estimated the speed of the other 
vehicle at 75 miles per hour (T.8). He turned and approached the 
vehicle from behind, and found that the vehicle was now traveling 
at 60 miles per hour (T.9). At first he saw one head in the car, 
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and then saw another one come up in the back seat, as if he had 
been awakened by the officer's approach• As he pulled up along 
side the vehicle, he intended to give the driver a hand signal to 
keep his speed down (T.9). He did not intend to stop the vehicle, 
because he had been unable to pace him and determine for sure that 
there had been a speeding violation (T.8-9; 24). The driver and 
the passenger, however, stared ahead and would not look at him, 
"both consciously trying not to look at me. Almost like they were 
guilty" (T.10; 29). The officer, acting on the looks of guilt, and 
observing that both persons in the vehicle were "obviously 
nervous," initiated a stop. He did not intend to issue a citation; 
but did intend to issue a warning and investigate further the 
nervousness and "guilty" demeanor (T.31). 
Trooper Bushnell asked Mr. Ziegleman, the driver of the 
vehicle, for a driver license and vehicle registration. He was 
provided with an insurance paper indicating that the car belonged 
to William Kayler, but no registration (T.10-11). Mr. Ziegleman 
gave the name of the owner of the car as "Bill," and said he had 
borrowed it for a trip to California and was returning home to 
Minnesota. He didn't seem to remember Bill's last name until he 
produced the insurance papers (T.36-37). Officer Bushnell called 
in the car information to his dispatcher to inquire about a 
possible stolen vehicle, and received a negative report. The 
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occupants remained very nervous and overly polite, which just 
increased his suspicions (T.12-13; 43). Mr. McNaughton was so 
nervous that he dropped the contents of his wallet on the ground, 
while attempting to look for identification (T.14). The officer 
asked for permission to search the vehicle, after asking if the 
vehicle contained drugs, weapons or narcotics (T.12-13). The 
search request was based primarily on the demeanor of the occupants 
and his feeling that "something was going on" (T.40; 53). 
The officer started a search of the vehicle, locating first a 
package of rolling papers in a tennis shoe in the back seat (T.14). 
Neither occupant would admit ownership of the rolling papers, which 
seemed odd, because the papers themselves were not illegal. By 
this time officer Bushnell and the Deputy Sheriff who was with him 
(but did not testify) had satisfied themselves that they were going 
to find evidence of a crime (T.45, 48). While the search was 
conducted, the Defendants "were both really intent on watching the 
car" (T.16). Eventually the officer searched under the hood, and 
found a package of cocaine, approximately 1 kilogram in weight, 
under an oily rag near the battery (T.16-17). When he searched 
under the hood, he was specifically looking for drugs, and 
primarily because of body language (specifically, the Defendants 
looked away, as he got closer) he was pretty sure of finding some 
(T.44-45, 52-53). 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Officer Bushnell stopped Defendants to investigate what he 
felt was suspicious behavior, chiefly consisting of a refusal to 
make eye contact, and other signs of what he believed was "nervous" 
or "guilty" behavior. Such a stop was not made with reasonable, 
articulable suspicion, and was an invalid stop under the United 
States and Utah Constitutions. 
Officer Bushnell investigated to see if he could find evidence 
of a stolen vehicle, and found none. Nevertheless, he continued to 
detain the Defendants, because of their continued suspicious, 
nervous and "guilty" behavior. The detention was illegal under the 
United States and Utah Constitutions. 
Upon making his determination that "something was wrong" 
Officer Bushnell asked for permission to search the vehicle. While 
permission was given by Defendant Brent Ziegleman, that permission 
was tainted by the illegal stop and seizure to the degree that, 
especially under the Utah Constitution, it was also invalid, and of 
no effect. 
Defendants were in legitimate control of the motor vehicle, 
and no suggestion has ever been made to the contrary. Therefore, 
Defendants did have a legitimate expectation of privacy, and a 
recognized right and standing to object to a warrantless search of 
their vehicle. Because of the illegalities referred to in previous 
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paragraphs, the objection made by Defendants to use of evidence 
illegally seized should be upheld, and that evidence should be 
suppressed. 
POINT I 
THE OFFICER DID NOT HAVE REASONABLE SUSPICION TO BELIEVE 
DEFENDANT HAD COMMITTED A CRIME, AND THEREFORE THE 
TRAFFIC STOP WAS IMPROPER. 
Before discussing the stop of Defendant and Appellant by 
Officer Bushnell, it is appropriate here to briefly discuss the 
standard of review. Over the last several years, the Appellate 
Courts in the State of Utah have had many occasions to discuss the 
standard of review in cases similar to the one at issue here. 
Unfortunately, that standard has not appeared to be the same in all 
cases. In fact, this standard in two suppression cases published 
in the most recent issue of Utah Advanced Reports seems to vary. 
In the case of State v. Sykes
 r 198 Utah Adv. Rep. 35 (Utah App. 
1992) the court stated that "a trial court's determination of 
reasonable suspicion should not be overturned unless it is clearly 
erroneous." 198 Utah Adv. Rep. at 36. That simple statement was, 
however, followed by a lengthy footnote qualifying it. There was 
also a lengthy concurring opinion discussing the standard of review 
further. 
In a case decided only nine days later, and published at the 
same time, this Court quoted the case of State v. Lopez, 831 P.2d 
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1040 (Utah App. 1992) and set forth the standard of review, as 
follows: 
In examining a denial of a motion to suppress, we review 
the trial court's findings of fact "under a 'clearly 
erroneous' standard" and the trial court's "ultimate 
legal conclusions" based on those findings "under a 
'correctness' standard." 198 Utah Adv. Rep. at 70. 
The exact standard to be applied thus continues to be a little 
vague. It does, however, seem that the court's determination of 
facts will be given more deference than the legal conclusions based 
upon those facts, which appears to be the traditional rule in Utah 
concerning mixed questions of law and fact (See Utah Department of 
Administrative Services v. Public Service Commission. 658 P.2d 601 
(Utah 1983)). Regarding the factual issues, it appears that it is 
up to the Appellant to "marshal the evidence" and then to 
demonstrate that the evidence is insufficient to support the 
finding of the court below, when viewed in the light most favorable 
to the decision. See Crookston v. Fire Insurance Exchange, 817 
P.2d 789 (Utah 1991). Since this is an interlocutory appeal, and 
since the arresting officer was the only person testifying at the 
suppression hearing, marshalling the evidence is not terribly 
difficult. Concerning the first legal issue, the validity of the 
stop, the court entered the following Findings of Fact: 
1. On July 20, 1991 on 1-15 within Juab County, Utah, 
Trooper Lance Bushnell, a four year veteran of the 
Utah Highway Patrol, observed a motor vehicle in 
the area of Nephi, and visually estimated the speed 
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to be in excess of 70 m.p.h., approximately 75 
m.p.h., but was unable to obtain a radar reading on 
the vehicle. The officer had received training and 
certification in estimating of speeds. 
2. The officer turned and followed the vehicle to 
obtain a paced speed, but the vehicle had slowed 
and was now traveling 60 m.p.h.. He then pulled 
alongside the vehicle with the intent of giving the 
driver a hand signal to slow down. Neither the 
driver nor the passenger would look towards him so 
he could signal them to slow down. The officer 
then stopped the vehicle with the intent of giving 
the driver a warning concerning his speeding 
(R.97). 
The actual testimony given by the officer, under direct and 
cross examination, is included in the addendum. While Defendant 
does not dispute the general accuracy of the Court's Findings of 
Fact set forth above, Defendant contends that they are superficial. 
As sometimes happens with Findings of Fact that are drafted by 
adverse counsel, the whole story may not be told. The court, in 
its actual written ruling, added the following comment to its 
findings concerning the justification of the initial stop: 
It should be noted that if defendants' lack of eye 
contact was the cause of the initial stop for speeding, 
it was only due to the fact that the officer had been 
unable to warn defendant Ziegleman about his excessive 
speed by giving hand signals. This behavior did not, in 
and of itself, lead the officer to believe that there was 
more serious criminal activity going on. Although the 
officer considers nervousness and shifty eye movements as 
evidence in guilty in certain circumstances, these 
behaviorisms in the later part of this investigation only 
served to reinforce other feelings as the investigation 
continued (R.89). 
No statement along this line was contained in the final 
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Findings of Fact, drafted by counsel for the State. Defendant did 
interpose a written objection, and stated: 
At the end of paragraph 2, a comma should be inserted 
after the word "speeding" and the following phrase should 
be added: "and investigating suspicious behavior of the 
occupants, in refusing to look at him" (R.93). 
That objection was overruled by the court in a ruling dated 
May 13, 1992 (R.102). The court's Findings of Fact, especially in 
its final form, appears to have glossed over, and ignored, the 
officer's own testimony. The officer, admittedly, did not intend 
to stop the vehicle at all, until he noticed that defendants would 
not look at him. He had been unable to pace the vehicle, or use 
his radar gun to verify a speeding citation, and, according to the 
officer: 
If I can't confirm a speed, either through pacing or 
radar, I wouldn't issue a citation. 
I just wouldn't do it. I don't know if the Department 
has a policy or not. I'm not going to write a citation 
if I can't verify a speed (T.24). 
The officer did nothing special (like honking his horn), to 
get their attention (T.29). Instead, he made a determination that 
something was going on that should be investigated, despite the 
fact that he could certainly not articulate it at the time, and 
that the stop was clearly made without reasonable articulable 
suspicion. In answers to cross-examination, the officer stated: 
A. I do remember they were both — it appeared to me -
- both consciously trying not to look at me. 
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Almost like they were guilty. So they were both 
looking straight ahead. 
Q. You felt they might be acting as if they were 
guilty? 
A. There's no doubt about it. My feeling is they were 
just acting guilty. Otherwise the guy in the back 
would have still be asleep. 
Q. Officer, I have to ask you: What were they acting 
like they were guilty of? 
A. If was obvious they wouldn't look over. They 
didn't want to look over at me. 
Q. Did they act — Does a drug runner — Does a 
person who's guilty of drug running act a little 
different type of guilty than a person who's guilty 
of just murdering his wife or just speeding or 
something else, or do they all act guilty, in your 
opinion? 
A. Well, they act nervous. These two were obviously 
nervous, yes, Sir (T.29-30). 
The officer, in answer to a further question, made it even 
more clear why he stopped the Defendants: 
Q. Do you notice any large amount of difference 
between people who aref "guilty of something," and 
those who aren't and their amount of nervousness?" 
A. Without fail, yes, Sir. 
Q. And in your opinion, that is a good thing to look 
for as an estimate that they're guilty of 
something? 
A. Probably the best one, yes, sir (T.31). 
By refusing to include, in its Findings of Fact, that the 
officer had stopped Defendants because of their nervous, suspicious 
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and "guilty" behavior, the trial court made a ruling that was 
"clearly erroneous". Under whatever standard of review is 
appropriate, the court's ruling on this point is subject to 
reversal. The officer had clearly determined that his visual speed 
estimate was not going to be a reason to stop the Defendants or to 
give them a citation. The officer made a determination, after 
observing the behavior of the Defendants, that they probably had 
committed, or were committing, a crime. He could not say what kind 
of crime, but he believed that there was indeed a crime. 
The authority of a police officer to stop a person and ask 
questions has been codified in Utah in § 77-7-15 U.C.A., set forth 
above. The right to be free from an unreasonable search or 
seizure, including the seizure of his person by stopping him and 
restraining him from leaving while asking questions is, of course, 
based upon the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United 
States Constitution. Under the constitutional and statutory 
principles recited above, the Utah Supreme Court has ruled that a 
police officer's description of two men seen walking at a late hour 
in a neighborhood where a burglary was reported did not provide 
other officers with "reasonable suspicion", sufficient to justify 
an investigatory stop of Defendant and his companion over two hours 
later. See State v. Swaniaan. 699 P.2d 718 (Utah 1985). Likewise, 
the Supreme Court ruled that reasonable suspicion was lacking for 
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an investigatory stop of a vehicle with out-of-state plates moving 
slowly at 3:00 a.m. through a neighborhood in which a rash of 
burglaries had recently occurred, absent an observation of any 
criminal or traffic offense and absent burglary reports that 
particular evening. See State v. Carpena, 714 P.2d 674 (Utah 
1986). In the case of State v. Truiillo. 739 P.2d 85 (Utah App. 
1987) this Court ruled a stop illegal where a police officer simply 
became suspicious of three men walking down state street in Salt 
Lake City at 3:00 a.m., looking in store windows, and behaving 
"suspiciously" when the police officer could not articulate what it 
was in particular that aroused his suspicions. 
In the case of State v. Sierra. 754 P.2d 972 (Utah App. 1988) 
an officer driving on Interstate 15, noticed that what he felt was 
unusual and suspicious behavior in the way a driver of another 
vehicle held his head and eyes, and used it to stop the vehicle and 
search it. The Sierra court first observed the standards for a 
constitutional stop: 
Officer Smith's stop of Sierra can be constitutionally 
justified on one of two alternative grounds. First, it 
could be based on specific, articulable facts which, 
together with rational inferences drawn from those facts, 
would lead a reasonable person to conclude Sierra had 
committed or was about to commit a crime (citations 
omitted). 
Second, the stop could be incident to a lawful citation 
for the traffic violation of driving unlawfully in the 
left lane. "Anything less would invite intrusions upon 
constitutionally guaranteed rights based on nothing more 
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substantial than inarticulate hunches, a result [the 
United States Supreme Court] has consistently refused to 
sanction" (citations omitted). 754 P.2d at 975. 
As in the instant case, the behavior of Defendant in refusing 
eye contact was the prime reason for the stop in the Sierra case. 
The court dismissed that as a proper cause and said: 
In making this assessment, the "avoidance of eye contact 
can have no weight whatsoever" (citations omitted). 
"Reasonable suspicion should not turn on opthalmological 
reactions of the appellant" (citations omitted). Id. 
The court went on to say: 
Applying the foregoing authority to the facts of this 
case, the totality of the circumstances confronting 
Officer Smith prior to seizing Sierra's car does not 
support a reasonable suspicion that Sierra was engaged in 
or about to be engaged in criminal activity. 
As we have stated, Sierra's failure to make eye contact 
with officer Smith is afforded no weight in determining 
if he had a reasonable suspicion to conduct an 
investigatory stop of Sierra (citations omitted). Such 
nervous conduct on Sierra's part when confronted by a 
Utah Highway Patrol Trooper is consistent with innocent 
as well as criminal behavior (citations omitted). Sierra 
did not try to evade Officer Smith, nor did he attempt to 
conceal anything when pursued by Officer Smith. 
We are convinced Officer Smith's decision to investigate 
Sierra was based on nothing more than an unconstitutional 
"hunch." The fact that his "hunch" proved correct is 
"perhaps a tribute to his policeman's intuition, but it 
is not sufficient to justify, ex post facto, a seizure 
that was not objectively reasonable at its inception." 
754 P.2d at 976-7. 
As in the instant case, the state argued that the stop was 
incident to a lawful stop for a traffic violation, driving 
unlawfully in the left lane. The court ruled that it was 
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"impermissible for law enforcement officers to use a misdemeanor 
arrest as a pretext to search for evidence of a more serious 
crime." 754 P.2d at 977. In that case, the police officer did at 
least have some kind of citation that he could issue. In the 
instant case, it is clear that, while the officer could and did 
issue a warning citation because he suspected a possible speeding 
violation, he did not have sufficient information to initiate a 
traffic stop for speeding. He did not intend to stop the vehicle 
at all for speeding. He stopped the vehicle because of the lack of 
eye contact and the "suspicious behavior". In doing so, he 
violated the rights of Defendants under the Fourth and Fourteenth 
Amendments. 
As a closing comment on the constitutionality of the stop, the 
Sierra Court stated: 
We are persuaded that a reasonable officer would not have 
stopped Sierra's car and issued the warning citation for 
traveling in the left lane but for his desire to 
investigate his previously-formed hunch of other criminal 
behavior. 754 P.2d at 972. 
If a reasonable officer would not have done so in the Sierra 
case, a reasonable officer would not do so here. 
The findings and decision in the Sierra case are in accord 
with several other cases in similar circumstances. In the case of 
State v. Mendoza, 748 P. 2d 181 (Utah 1987) an investigatory stop by 
U.S. Border Patrol Officers operating near St. George, was 
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invalidated under the following circumstances: 
The officers in this case relied on the following facts 
in determining that they had a reasonable suspicion 
justifying the stop of the Mustang: (1) the apparent 
"Latin descent" of the occupants of the Mustang; (2) the 
route of travel; (3) the time of day; (4) the time of 
year; (5) the California license plates; (6) the erratic 
driving pattern; and (7) the nervous behavior of the 
occupants. 748 P.2d at 183. 
In addressing the contention that nervous behavior of the 
occupants of the vehicle contributed to the stop, the court stated: 
The final fact relied upon by the officers was 
defendants7 "nervous behavior." When asked to describe 
defendants7 behavior more specifically, the officers 
merely stated that defendants had a "white-knuckled" or 
rigid look and failed to make eye contact. The Fifth 
Circuit Court of Appeals has held that the failure to 
make eye contact can have no weight in determining if the 
officers had a reasonable suspicion to conduct an 
investigatory stop, (citations omitted) 748 P.2d at 184. 
In the case of Sandy City v. Thorsness. 778 P. 2d 1011 (Utah 
App. 1989) this court found no articulable and reasonable suspicion 
when an officer stopped a motorist who had briefly stopped to watch 
the officer assist another motorist, and had failed to 
"immediately" move on when signaled to do so by the officer. 
In the case of State v. Talbot, 792 P.2d 489 (Utah App. 1990) 
this court invalidated an investigative stop of someone who had 
appeared to avoid a police roadblock. The court there once again 
stated that the stop would only be justified if it was incident to 
a traffic offense or based upon a reasonable and articulable 
suspicion that the occupants of the vehicle had committed or were 
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about to commit a crime. 
In the case of State v. Arroyo, 796 P.2d 684 (Utah 1990) the 
court invalidated a stop, on the same stretch of highway involved 
in this case, where a police officer had followed a camper 
containing two hispanic occupants, and with California plates. The 
stop was made, according to the officer, because, after a period of 
following the vehicle, he found that the driver had been following 
another vehicle too close. The court found that the stop was not 
made for the stated purpose, but was made for "some unarticulated 
suspicion of more serious criminal activity." 796 P.2d at 688. 
In the 1991 case of State v. Steward. 806 P.2d 213 (Utah App. 
1991) this court found no articulable reasonable suspicion to stop 
a vehicle driving into a cul-de-sac just before midnight, even 
though a search was under way of three houses in the cul-de-sac for 
the purpose of locating a methamphetamine lab. 
In conclusion, the suspicion of criminal activity by an 
officer is not sufficient to stop a motor vehicle to investigate 
those suspicions. The suspicion must be reasonable, and must be 
articulable. Nervous behavior or avoidance of eye contact has 
specifically been found by several courts not to be useful in 
articulating that reasonable suspicion. The officer's testimony 
was directly to the point. He had used behavior that to him 
denoted "guilt" for a pretext stop, even though the courts have 
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ruled that this specific behavior cannot so be used. The stop was 
illegal, unconstitutional, and invalid. 
POINT II 
THE OFFICER WAS NOT JUSTIFIED IN DETAINING DEFENDANTS 
SUBSEQUENT TO THE INITIAL STOP AND INVESTIGATING MATTERS 
NOT RELATED TO THAT STOP. 
Once again, the Court made Findings of Fact regarding the 
continuing investigation and the detention of the Defendants while 
that investigation continued. Those Findings of Fact are set out 
below: 
4. Upon stopping the vehicle, the officer approached 
the driver and asked for a driver's license and 
registration. The driver produced a driver's 
license, but was unable to produce a registration. 
The driver claimed the owner's name was "Bill" and 
he was a friend and he had borrowed the car, but 
could give no further information concerning his 
name or where he lived. While the driver searched 
for the registration, he appeared to be extremely 
nervous with the hands trembling. The occupants 
had no written authorization or anything that gave 
them the right to be in possession of the vehicle. 
5. The officer ran the vehicle through the NCIC 
computer to determine if it was reported stolen. 
The request came back negative, but the officer 
continued to investigate the possibility of a 
stolen vehicle, because of his past experience of 
finding stolen vehicles not listed on NCIC as 
stolen (R.97-98). 
The officer approached Mr. Ziegleman, and asked for a driver 
license and vehicle registration. Mr. Ziegleman was able to 
produce a driver license, but could not find a vehicle 
registration. He indicated that he had borrowed the vehicle for a 
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short trip to California, from his friend "Bill" but didn't or 
couldn't give a last name. He did, however, produce an insurance 
paper with the name William Kayler. The officer's suspicions were 
heightened. He stated, at the suppression hearing: 
Well, while he was looking for that, it was quite obvious 
he was nervous. His hands were trembling more so than 
the general motoring public. 
That aroused my suspicion, and the fact he couldn't find 
a registration, and the fact that he called him Bill and 
couldn't give me a last name of the subject either. I 
was suspicious the vehicle was stolen (T.ll). 
Regarding Mr. McNaughton, the passenger who was in the back 
seat, the officer had this observation concerning his demeanor: 
And he quickly came over to that [window], tried to talk 
to me through the window. And he quickly rolled the 
window down and then he moved back to the other side. He 
was obviously nervous. He was doing everything quickly, 
abrupt, and trying to answer the questions I had for him. 
And he really showed his nervousness there (T.12). 
The officer responded to these additional indications of 
"guilt" by almost immediately inquiring about what laws they might 
have possibly broken: 
I just asked several things: If they had any weapons in 
the vehicle, any drugs or narcotics, anything to make 
them as nervous as they appeared to be (T.12). 
The officer also called in the information he had on the motor 
vehicle to see if there were any reports of a stolen vehicle. The 
report came back negative (T.36). The officer testified that at 
some point he would have had to make a decision as to whether to 
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hold the Defendants for further investigation, based upon his 
various suspicions, but that he did not have to make that decision. 
Based upon head movements, hand movements, and lack of vehicle 
registration, the officer decided that "something was going on" and 
asked for permission to search the vehicle. The officer testified 
that in far less than half (T.41) of cases in which one person was 
driving a vehicle belonging to another, would that person have 
written permission. The lack of written permission was an 
additional pretext to look for further information regarding some 
kind of crime, although the officer clearly did not know yet what 
kind of crime he was looking for. The following summary was made 
of the officer's testimony, at the end of cross-examination: 
Q. Let me just see if we can get this down to a few 
sentences, Officer. 
The incident occurred because, number one, you 
thought they were speeding and they slowed down; 
number two, they wouldn't look at you; number 
three, the vehicle belonged to somebody that wasn't 
in the vehicle; and number four, body language. 
Is that it in a nutshell, or is there anything else 
that contributed to the whole incident and your 
behavior on that incident? 
A. You could probably put it in those categories, sir 
(T.53). 
The court, in its written ruling, prior to entering its formal 
Findings of Fact, referred to the continuing detention only as 
sufficient to check with NCIC to see if the car had been stolen. 
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The court found reasonable articulable suspicion that the car might 
have been stolen, because of the vague references to "Bill" and the 
lack of adequate registration papers in the vehicle. The Findings 
of Fact that the court entered, of course, included the negative 
finding on the NCIC check. The court failed to note, in its 
Findings, that the negative check of the NCIC network did not seem 
to affect the officer's suspicions at all. The officer had already 
decided that "something was going on" and that the nervousness and 
body language of the Defendants meant that they were "guilty" of 
something. He simply continued to look for something that they 
might have been guilty of doing. Defendant Ziegleman contends 
that, after the testimony of the officer concerning the initial 
stop and preliminary investigation, there was still no reasonable 
articulable suspicion of anything. What the officer was doing was 
going on a fishing expedition; and the trial court appears to have 
been looking for some ground on which to allow him to continue. 
The circumstances of the detention of the Defendants in this matter 
were almost identical to the circumstances in the case of State v. 
Robinson, 797 P.2d 431 (Utah App. 1990). In that case, Defendant 
did not attack the actual stop, but did attack the investigatory 
detention. This court, in reviewing the findings of the trial 
court, found that the trial court had based its finding of a 
reasonable suspicion on the nervousness of Defendant during the 
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initial traffic stop, accompanied by "the body language" and lack 
of eye contact noted by the officer in the instant case. The trial 
court had also noted the failure of Defendants to produce either 
written permission from the vehicle owner or a successful means of 
contacting the owner during the traffic stop to verify the 
permissive use of the van. The court cited State v. Sierra and 
stated: 
In part because avoidance of eye contact is consistent 
with innocent as well as criminal behavior, Utah 
Appellate Courts have previously held that such nervous 
conduct can be afforded no weight in determining a 
detaining officer's reasonable suspicion of criminal 
activity. 797 P.2d at 436. 
The court went on to discuss the various aspects of the 
nervous behavior noted by the officers, and then said: 
In the absence of other, objective facts, we decline to 
give much weight to an officer's assessment of 
"nervousness" due to the subjectivity of that 
determination. Id. 
In Robinson, the trial court had also noted the absence of 
cold weather gear and clothing which might have been used to 
substantiate the story of the camping trip towards which Robinson 
indicated they were traveling. After dismissing that finding as 
inadequate, the court went on to discuss the detention: 
At the time Garcia detained defendants by ordering them 
to stand by the van until he returned from conversing 
with Ogden, the warning citation had already been given. 
The troopers had already obtained valid drivers' licenses 
and a valid vehicle registration, as had the detaining 
officer in Guzman, 864 F.2d at 1519. The troopers knew 
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that the vehicle had not been reported as stolen. They 
had checked the tendered sources for verifying 
defendants7 claim that the van owner had indeed given 
them permission to use the van. This checking disclosed 
no further information or facts upon which the officers 
could base any suspicion that the van had been stolen and 
no reason to believe that these potential verification 
sources could be pursued again, with success, within a 
reasonable time. 
Even considering all the circumstances facing the 
troopers, the fact the defendants could not — during the 
brief time span of the valid traffic stop — produce 
either written authorization from the owner or a 
successful telephone contact with the owner is 
insufficient to provide the officers with reasonable 
suspicion of car theft or other serious crime sufficient 
to justify the roadside detention and questioning that 
followed. Id. 
The situation is almost the same here. The only noticeable 
difference is that Mr. Ziegleman produced only an insurance paper, 
and not a registration. That difference certainly does not justify 
a detention in this case, or the continued investigation. It is 
clear that the officer in this matter was not continuing to pursue 
any theory of the car being stolen, after the NCIC check proved 
negative. He was simply looking for something, anything at all, to 
show some sort of guilt. That is not reasonable and is not 
articulable suspicion. It appears that the question of fact 
addressed by the court will be reviewed under a standard of clear 
error. Defendant contends that the findings of the court regarding 
the detention were clear error, especially when viewed in 
connection with the court's earlier error regarding the validity of 
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the stop. 
This court relied extensively on the Robinson case in the more 
recent case of State v. Godina-Lunaf 826 P. 2d 652 (Utah App. 1992). 
In that case, when the driver, who was not the registered owner of 
the vehicle had had no written permission to drive it, was asked 
for his driver license and the vehicle registration. He shook 
"just like someone that just wants to please just like I did when 
my mom was after me when I got in the cookies when I was eight 
years old." 826 P. 2d at 653. The driver was able to produce a 
valid registration, but did not have a driver license. Once again, 
an NCIC check for a stolen vehicle was negative. Once again, the 
nervous behavior prompted the deputy to continue asking questions, 
and his suspicion was particularly aroused when the driver 
indicated he had borrowed the car in Salt Lake City to go to 
Chicago. Since the stop was made on 1-70, the deputy tended to 
disbelieve that the driver was headed from Salt Lake City to 
Chicago. In the Godina-Luna case, the court ruled that the initial 
stop was valid, due to an articulable suspicion of possible drunk 
driving. The court went on to say, however, regarding the 
continued seizure and detention: 
Once a Fourth Amendment seizure has occurred, any 
detention for reasons exceeding the scope of the original 
stop and not reasonably related to the circumstances 
justifying the stop in the first place is illegal, 
(citations omitted). 
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In other words, "the length and scope of the detention 
must be 'strictly tied to and justified by' the 
circumstances which rendered its initiation permissible." 
(citations omitted). Once the reasons for the initial 
stop have been satisfied, the individual must be allowed 
to proceed on his or her way. "Any further temporary 
detention for investigative questioning after the 
fulfillment of the purpose for the original traffic stop 
is justified under the fourth amendment only if the 
detaining officer has a reasonable suspicion of serious 
criminal activity." (citations omitted). 826 P.2d at 
654-5. 
The court went on to make the following observation regarding 
the success of the officer's continued investigation: 
Although the deputy's hunch ultimately proved to be 
correct, a hunch, without more, does not raise a 
reasonable articulable suspicion regardless of the final 
result. 826 P.2d at 655. 
In the recent case of United States v. Walker, 933 F.2d 812 
(10th Cir. 1991); Rehearing Denied, 941 F.2d 1086; Cert. Denied 112 
S.Ct. 1168 (1992) similar issues arose. Mr. Walker was stopped in 
Emery County after being clocked at 67 m.p.h. in a 55 mile per hour 
zone. An NCIC check on a possible stolen vehicle came back 
negative. Defendant was nervous, and his hands shook. He had a 
hard time getting his license out of his wallet. He told the 
officer that the registered owner of the vehicle, Marion Smith, was 
his sister, and he was driving her car with her permission. 
Nevertheless, based upon the nervousness, the officer continued to 
ask questions not concerned with the traffic stop. Ultimately, he 
asked for permission to search the vehicle, which was granted. The 
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Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the ruling of the U.S. 
District Court for the District of Utah in its finding that the 
detention was unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment: 
Relying on United States v. Guzman, 864 F.2d 1512 (10th 
Cir. 1988), the district court determined that officer 
Graham's continued detention of the defendant in order to 
ask him intrusive questions unrelated to the traffic stop 
was a violation of the defendant's Fourth Amendment 
rights. The district court found that the defendant's 
nervousness did not create an objectively reasonable 
suspicion of criminal activity that would justify the 
detention. The court further indicated that the 
defendant had produced sufficient proof showing he was 
entitled to operate the car such that no reasonable 
suspicion of criminal activity arose from the fact that 
the car was not registered to the defendant. 933 F.2d at 
814. 
The Court stated further: 
The officer detained the defendant to ask him questions 
unrelated to the speeding infraction or to the 
defendant's right to operate the car. Thus, the 
detention was not reasonably related in scope to the 
circumstances that justified the interference in the 
first place. As such, it was an unreasonable seizure 
under the fourth amendment. 933 F.2d at 816. 
The facts of the instant case show no additional reason for 
suspicion that was not present in the cases cited. Certainly, the 
officer has utterly and absolutely failed in any of his feeble 
attempts to articulate what that suspicion was. Under even the 
most stringent standard of review, the ruling of the district court 
fails on this point as well, and this court should rule that the 
continuing detention of defendants was an unlawful seizure under 
the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. 
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POINT III 
ANY CONSENT GIVEN BY MR. ZIEGLEMAN WAS TAINTED BY AN 
ILLEGAL STOP AND AN ILLEGAL SEIZURE, AND WAS NOT A VALID 
AND VOLUNTARY CONSENT TO SEARCH. 
The Court below, in its Findings of Fact regarding the actual 
search of Mr. Ziegleman's vehicle, stated: 
6. The officer then asked the driver if there were any 
weapons, drugs or narcotics in the vehicle. The 
driver said there was not any. The officer then 
asked for consent to search, Mr. Ziegleman 
unhesitatingly replied "help yourself". 
7. The officer then searched the interior of the 
vehicle and found nothing of substance. The 
officer then asked for consent to search the trunk, 
which consent was again given by the driver. Again 
no contraband was found therein. The officer then 
searched the hood area. Between the right front 
fender and the battery was an oil cloth covering a 
brown grocery sack with a kilogram of cocaine 
contained therein (R.98). 
The Findings of Fact adopted by the court did not include the 
court's full reasoning, as referred to in the court's written 
ruling. The court stated, in that written ruling: 
However, the initial stop was valid, the subsequent 
detention was valid, and the contraband was discovered 
under the hood of the car pursuant to a valid consent to 
a search, and thus it is admissible (R.90). 
Obviously, the court relied on a valid stop and a valid 
detention. It has been the position of Appellant in this brief 
that the rulings of the court in those regards were in error. If 
those erroneous underpinnings are taken away from the court's 
ruling, that ruling concerning a valid consent no longer has 
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support. 
Defendant has previously cited, in support of his position, 
the Utah case of State v. Sierra. It is important to note that, 
while the bulk of that decision is still good law in the state of 
Utah, part of it has been specifically overruled. The Sierra 
decision quoted federal cases, primarily United States v. Carson, 
793 F.2d 1141, (10th Cir. 1986) Cert. Denied, 479 U.S. 914 (1986) 
for the proposition that a consent, even after an illegal stop and 
seizure, was reviewed independently for its voluntariness. That 
rule was overruled by the Utah Supreme Court in the case of State 
v. Arroyo, 796 P. 2d 684 (Utah 1990). The Utah Supreme Court put 
the burden of establishing a valid search squarely on the 
prosecution and stated: 
When the prosecution attempts to prove voluntary consent 
after an illegal police action (e.g., unlawful arrest or 
stop) , the prosecution "has a much heavier burden to 
satisfy than when proving consent to search" which does 
not follow police misconduct. 796 P.2d at 687-8. 
In the Arroyo case, the court had already found the conduct of 
the police in stopping and detaining the defendant to be 
unjustified. The court thereafter set up a new test: 
Two factors determine whether consent to a search is 
lawfully obtained following initial police misconduct. 
The inquiry should focus on whether the consent was 
voluntary and whether the consent was obtained by police 
exploitation of the prior illegality. Evidence obtained 
in searches following police illegality must meet both 
tests to be admissible. 796 P.2d at 688. 
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The court first reviewed United States v. Carsonf and 
specifically rejected its ruling which made an independent review 
of the voluntariness of the consent. The court then reviewed State 
v. Sierra which had adopted the Carson rule, and stated: 
However, we disagree with the rule established in Sierra 
because it fails to give proper weight to Fourth 
Amendment values, and we address the issue of the proper 
standard to be applied in this jurisdiction under the 
second prong of the analysis. 796 P.2d at 689. 
The new rule in the State of Utah, as enunciated by the Utah 
Supreme Court is as follows: 
The basis for the second part of the two-part analysis is 
found in the "fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine of 
Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 83 S. Ct. 407, 
9 L. Ed. 2d 441 (1963), which stated that a trial court 
must determine in such a case "'Whether granting 
establishment of the primary illegality/ the evidence to 
which instant objection is made has been come at by 
exploitation of that illegality or instead by means 
sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of the primary 
taint.'" 371 U.S. at 488, 83 S. Ct. at 417 (quoting 
MaGuire, evidence of guilt 221 (1959)). The "fruit of 
the poisonous tree" doctrine has been extended to 
invalidate consents which, despite being voluntary, are 
nonetheless the exploitation of a prior police 
illegality. 796 P.2d at 690. 
The Arroyo case was followed by this court in the recent case 
of State v. Godina-Lunar previously cited. Regarding consent, this 
court stated that "the State must show the consent was (1) 
voluntary, and (2) not obtained by exploitation of the prior 
illegality." 826 P. 2d at 655. The court went on to state that the 
Arroyo case "requires that the State 'establish the existence of 
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intervening factors which prove that the consent was sufficiently 
attenuated from the illegal stop./n 826 P.2d at 655-6. Finally, 
the court summed it all up thusly: 
Here, such intervening factors simply do not exist. The 
consent occurred during an ongoing illegal seizure, thus 
no time factor separated the illegality from the consent. 
Nor were there any intervening circumstances separating 
the illegality from the consent. Orozco's invitation to 
search was not of itself an intervening circumstance 
because the invitation came in response to a question 
posed in the midst of an ongoing illegal seizure. 826 
P.2d at 656. 
The circumstances of the present case are identical. Once 
again, the consent to search was given under circumstances that 
cannot be separated from an illegal stop and an illegal detention. 
The consent to search was illegally obtained, and the evidence must 
be suppressed. 
The Utah Supreme Court, in the case of State v. Larocco, 794 
P. 2d 460 (Utah 1990) granted specific protections against 
unreasonable search and seizure under Article I Section 14 of the 
Utah Constitution. Thus, a Defendant in Utah no longer has to rely 
exclusively on the Fourteenth Amendment and federal case law for 
his protection against unreasonable searches and seizures. In that 
case, the Supreme Court invalidated a warrantless search even 
though the investigating officers had probable cause to suspect 
that it was stolen. The court ruled that the state had failed to 
justify a warrantless search by showing either that the procurement 
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of a warrant would have jeopardized the safety of the police 
officers or that the evidence was likely to have been lost or 
destroyed. The court then stated: 
We now expressly hold the exclusion of illegally obtained 
evidence is a necessary consequence of police violations 
of Article I Section 14. 794 P.2d at 472. 
The Utah Supreme Court has had occasion to review its earlier 
rulings regarding consent searches and the exclusionary rule in the 
recent case of Sims v. Utah State Tax Commission, 198 Utah Adv. 
Rep. 5 (Utah 1992). In that case, the Utah Supreme Court 
invalidated a search made at an illegal police road block, even 
though the police had obtained a consent to search at that road 
block. The Supreme Court thereafter extended the exclusionary rule 
to proceedings brought in front of the Utah State Tax Commission 
for failure to affix drug tax stamps. The rule is therefore clear 
that, under both the United States Constitution and the Utah 
Constitution, the search of a vehicle after an illegal stop and an 
illegal detention is in itself illegal, unless there are unusual 
circumstances which satisfy the strong burden of proof on the state 
to show that the consent was given separately from the stop and the 
detention. It is also clear that, under the United States and Utah 
Constitutions, evidence obtained after an illegal search of a 
vehicle must be excluded. 
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POINT IV 
THE ILLEGAL SEARCH AND SEIZURE MADE BY THE OFFICER DID 
VIOLATE A PROTECTED RIGHT AND A REASONABLE EXPECTATION OF 
PRIVACY IN DEFENDANTS. 
The Court's Findings of Fact have been discussed previously. 
The Court, however, also made a Conclusion of Law which needs to be 
addressed in this brief. The Conclusion of Law that appears to be 
separate from the Findings earlier discussed is Conclusion number 
4 and is as follows: 
Neither defendant had a reasonable expectation of privacy 
to the hood area of the subject vehicle, and therefore 
did not have standing to object to a search of that area 
of the vehicle (R.99). 
This conclusion was a substantially abbreviated version of 
Point Four of the Court's written ruling. In that ruling, the 
court cited the case of State v. Taylor, 169 Utah Adv. Rep. 62 for 
the proposition that Defendants did not have a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in the hood area of the motor vehicle which 
they were driving. That case is now cited as 818 P. 2d 561 (Utah 
App. 1991). In the court's written ruling and the conclusion of 
law based upon it, the court has made a legal decision as opposed 
to a factual one. This being a legal conclusion, this court 
reviews that conclusion under a "correctness standard". See State 
v. Lopez
 f 831 P. 2d 1040 (Utah App. 1992) and State v. Sepulveda. 
198 Utah Adv. Rep. 69 (Utah App. 1992). The court below, without 
discussing State v. Taylor at any great length, decided that the 
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hood area of the car in particular could be searched without a 
warrant, and without standing to challenge by Defendants, because 
Defendants, not being the owners of the vehicle, did not have a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in the hood area in particular. 
Defendant Ziegleman here contends that the court below made an 
error of lciw in so reading State v. Taylor. This court in that 
case, specifically discussed whether or not the user of the vehicle 
had standing to challenge a warrantless search of a car, even 
though he was not the record owner. The court there found that a 
subjective expectation of privacy was unreasonable where a 
defendant could not demonstrate the right to use a vehicle, and 
cited the earlier case of State v. Constantino, 732 P.2d 125 (Utah 
1987) for that proposition. The District Court cited no case law, 
and none has been found, for the proposition that parts of the car 
can be searched only with permission, and that other parts may be 
searched without permission, because those parts are not within a 
reasonable expectation of privacy. In fact, since the Taylor case, 
this court has reviewed the privacy expectation of a permissive 
driver more completely, and found that the reasonable expectation 
of privacy does extend to the whole car. 
That issue was raised in State v. Robinson, previously cited. 
It was disposed of rather quickly in a footnote: 
The defendants' testimony that they were given permission 
by the owner to take the van on a two-week vacation trip 
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was not disputed by the State. We hold that they 
established a possessory interest in the van sufficient 
to give them both a legitimate expectation of privacy in 
the entire van interior. 797 P.2d at 437 (note 6). 
In the more recent case of State v. Sepulvedar also previously 
cited, the court first quoted the note set forth above, and then 
stated: 
In the instant case, Officer Mangelson was the only 
witness to testify at the hearing on defendant's motion 
to suppress. Officer Mangelson stated that when he 
inquired how defendant obtained possession of the car, 
defendant responded "the car belonged to a friend in 
California." According to Officer Mangelson, defendant 
said he and his passengers had been given permission from 
a friend to drive this car to Utah. Officer Mangelson 
initially noted the interior of the car was cluttered, as 
if defendant and his passengers had been living in the 
car. 
Therefore, at the time of the search, the facts 
established (1) defendant was driving the car, (2) 
defendant had permission to use the car, and (3) 
defendant had personal belongings in the car. 
Following the two-step standard outlined in Taylor, we 
first conclude defendants statement that the car belonged 
to a friend in California who loaned it to defendant 
demonstrates a subjective expectation of privacy in the 
car. We must next conclude, as a matter of law, whether 
the statement manifests an expectation of privacy society 
is willing to recognize is legitimate. See Taylor, 818 
P.2d at 565. 191 Utah Adv. Rep. at 71. 
In the cases summarized above, a driver who has permission to 
use a vehicle and has personal belongings in the car has a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in the car and its contents. In 
contrast to the Defendant in Constantinof Defendant in the present 
case told Officer Mangelson he was driving the car with the owner's 
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permission. As in Robinsonf Defendant's statement in Sepulveda 
that he borrowed the car he was driving with the owner's permission 
was sufficient to confer "a legitimate expectation of privacy in 
the entire [car] interior." Robinson. 797 P.2d at 437 N.6. 
Defendant's claim that he had permission to drive the 
Camaro was unrefuted, he had personal belongings within 
the car's interior, and Officer Mangelson had no 
information the car was stolen at the time of the search. 
Therefore, we are persuaded defendant demonstrated an 
expectation of privacy sufficient to prevent him to 
challenge Officer Mangelson's warrantless search of the 
car. 198 Utah Adv. Rep. at 71. 
Once again, the expectation of privacy appears to be in the 
entire automobile, once a reasonable expectation of privacy is 
established by some indication that the car is permissively 
operated by the defendant. As in the other cases cited, Defendant 
stated that he had borrowed the car from a friend and that he did 
in fact have authorization to drive it. As in the other cases, 
there was no information known to the officer that the car was 
stolen. In fact, the car has been impounded by the officer, and 
has been in possession of the state for many months since Defendant 
was stopped. There has never been any suggestion since that time 
that Defendant did not have lawful possession of the automobile; 
and certainly the officer never suggested such when he testified at 
the hearing. There is absolutely no legal authority for the 
court's suggestion that one part of the car is protected more than 
another. The Taylor case that the court cited did not involve an 
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automobile at all. It involved the searching of a cabin in which 
Defendant had previously been a guest on occasion. The court, 
after determining that Defendant had failed to show that he 
routinely used the cabin, or he had permission to use it on a 
regular basis, had not demonstrated a subjective privacy 
expectation when he was not present during the search, and could 
not assert a direct personal right. 
As in the Sepulveda case, Defendant had personal items in both 
the passenger compartment and trunk of the car. The passenger 
compartment and trunk of the car were searched first, and the hood 
area was only searched after everything else. It was clear that 
the officer was continuing to look for something that he expected 
to find, first in the passenger compartment, second in the trunk, 
and thirdly anywhere else he could think of. The entire search was 
one operation; and nobody suggested that the search of the hood 
area was somehow separate, and under some separate basis of 
authority, from the search of the rest of the vehicle. The 
reasonable expectation of privacy which "arises when defendant is 
personally present at or in possession of property with the 
authority or permission of the owner" (State v. Taylor, 818 P. 2d at 
567) is present in this matter, and this court should correct the 
legal error of the court below and find Defendant does in fact have 
standing. 
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CONCLUSION 
Defendants Brent Ziegleman and Michael McNaughton were 
illegally stopped by a Highway Patrol Officer on July 20, 1991, and 
were illegally held or "seized" by that officer pending an illegal 
investigation. Any search was a "fruit of the poison tree" 
resulting from the illegal stop and detention; and Defendants do 
now have standing to object to the search. Because the evidence to 
be used against Brent Ziegleman by the state was seized as the 
result of a string of unlawful proceedings by the Utah Highway 
Patrol Officer, use of that evidence must be suppressed; and the 
ruling of the court below denying the suppression should be 
reversed. / 
DATED this gT?t
 day of A/biJA^k^ , 1992. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the day of A/lU^L/ . 1992, 
I did mail four true and correct copies of the above and foregoing 
Brief of Appellant, postage prepaid to R. Paul Van Dam, Utah 
Attorney General, 236 State Capitol, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114. 
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C I R C U I T 
IN THE }WTf€>&COUR 
IN AND FOR JUAB COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
F I L t W 
IN THE CIRCUIT COURT 
JUL 23B££3irfl| 
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Depuiv 
THE STATE OF UTAH 
Plaintiff 
vs. 
BRENT LEE ZIEGELMAN d00ob0 9-16-45 
1+3-42 
ana 
MICHAEL JOHN McNAUGHTON d.o.b 
/ / 0(i L4U£6 ^ Defendants) ^ 
Information 
Criminal No 9/ O/t 'OC g> 
The undersigned, L a n c e B u s h n e l l 
^SW1 
. under 
oath states on information and belief, that the defendant(s), on or about the 2 0 t h 
day of_ J u l y 19. 9 1 at Juab County, State of Utah, unlawfully did 
commit the second degree felony of violating Utah's Controlled 
Substance Act as follows: The defendants did knowingly or 
intentionally possess cocaine, a controlled substance, with 
the intent to distribute; contrary to Section 58-37-8 (1)(a)(iv) 
UcCoAo 1953 as amended*. 
This information is based on evidence obtained from the following witnesses. 
Lance Bushnell, Utah Highway Patrol 
Author/Ved for pres k 
> f a - y 8 r > ^ "1 ^ 
County'Attor ~T 
/flAt*- CkktU/M/r 
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MCCULLOUGH, JONES & IVINS 
Attorneys for Defendant Ziegleman 
930 South State Street, Suite 10 
Orem, Utah 84058 
Telephone: (801) 224-2119 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF JUAB COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
oooOooo 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
BRENT ZIEGLEMAN and MICHAEL 
McNAUGHTON, 
Defendants. 
MOTION TO SUPPRESS 
EVIDENCE 
Case No. 
(Judge Ballif) 
oooOooo 
COMES NOW the Defendant Brent Ziegleman and moves the court 
for an Order suppressing the use by Plaintiff of any and all 
evidence obtained as a result of a stop and search of the vehicle 
Defendant was driving at the time of his arrest. This Motion is 
made on the grounds that such stop and search constituted a search 
and seizure pursuant to the Utah State Constitution and the 
Constitution of the United States, and that it was done without 
reasonable suspicion as required by said Constitutions and recent 
case law of the Utah Supreme Court. 
Defendant Ziegleman requests that an evidentiary hearing be 
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held on this Motion and that the state be directed to give evidence 
sufficient to constitute a reasonable suspicion for the initial 
stop and "seizure11 of Defendant. 
This Motion will be supported with a Memorandum of Points and 
Authorities, to be submitted hereafter. 
DATED this v day of September, 1991. 
MCCULLOUGH, JONES, & IVINS 
CJ^ fit 
W. Andrew McCullough 
Attorney for Defendant, ZiegWman 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the 4 day of September, 1991, I 
did mail a true and correct copy of the above and foregoing Motion 
to Suppress Evidence, postage prepaid, to Donald Eyre, Attorney for 
Plaintiff, 125 North Main Street, Nephi, Utah 84648 and Milton T. 
Harmon, Attorney for Defendant, Michael McNaughton, 3 6 South Main, 
Nephi, Utah 84648. 
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particular area? 
A Yes, sir, I did. 
Q And have you estimated speeds and used 
Dopier radars throughout your career with the 
Highway Patrol? 
A Yes, sir. 
Q Referring you now to July the 20th of 
this year, were you on duty within Juab County on 
that date? 
A Yes, sir. 
Q And referring you to the defendants, Mr. 
Ziegleman and Mr. McNaughton, seated at counsel 
table, did you have an occasion to meet those two 
individuals on that date? 
A Yes, sir, I did. 
Q Where did that take place? 
A It was on Interstate 15 of milepost 221. 
That's approximately a mile south of Nephi. 
Q And were they in a motor vehicle that you 
observed? 
A Yes, sir, they were. 
Q Where were you located when you initially 
observed this motor vehicle? 
A Initially we were approximately milepost 
two-- it would have been probably 218. 
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Q And were you mobile or stationary? 
A Mobile. 
Q And describe what you observed on that 
occas ion. 
A I was southbound, and the vehicle they 
were operating was northbound. 
And while I was driving southbound, I 
observed this vehicle approaching at a high rate 
of speed. And at the time I was using a radar 
that wasn't my radar. It was one I had borrowed. 
And it was a Hawk-- or sorry. Mine's a Hawk, and 
this one's a Speed Gun 8. And it doesn't have 
real great mobile radar capabilities. So I wasn't 
able to even obtain a speed to that vehicle. But 
I'd estimate in excess of 75. 
Q And after you had made an estimate did 
you attempt to obtain a radar reading on it? 
A I attempted the whole time. But like I 
said, that radar doesn't really allow you that 
capabi1ity. 
Q And after you had made that visual 
estimate what-- did you do anything in response to 
that observation? 
A Yes. I let them go down the road a 
little ways. And generally I will let them go so 
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it doesn't appear I'm going after them until they 
get further down the road. And I pull into the 
median so I can pace them so they don't see me 
coming. 
In this case it was my opinion they did see 
me coming. They slowed down dramatically. 
Q Did you get in behind them? 
A Yes, I did. While I was behind them the 
speed that I had them at was approximately 60 
miles-an-hour. 
Q And at that point in time what did you do 
next? 
A I pulled along side them. And the 
intentions were I was just going to pull along 
side them and give them the finger to slow down 
like that (Indicating.) But I couldn't get the 
attention of either one of them. 
Initially the only one that was visible was 
the driver. And while I was along side of them, 
the passenger was visible then. He wasn't 
before. Apparently, he had awoken or something. 
Q He was in the front seat or the back 
seat? 
A In the back seat. 
Q Describe the vehicle that they were in. 
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A Exact? It was probably an ' '82. It was 
a Chevy Caprice. It was an '82, green in color, 
and it had Minnesota tags on it. 
Q You indicated that you drove along side 
them and you attempted to get their attention? 
A I would have motioned them to slow down, 
but neither one of them would look at me. 
Q Then what happened? 
A I pulled around and stopped the vehicle. 
Q And upon approaching the vehicle who was 
the driver of the vehicle? 
A Ziegleman. Mr. Ziegleman, I think that's 
how you say it. 
Q And describe what you did upon 
approaching the driver? 
A I just requested a driver's license and 
vehicle information. And Mr. Ziegleman did offer 
a driver's license, but he wasn't able to locate 
any kind of vehicle information. 
He did say the owner of the car-- the owner 
was Bill. And he was able to offer an insurance 
paper that had the name William-- let's see. I 
think I have it here. Insurance paper had a name 
of William Kayler. 
Q But he was not able to produce a 
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registration for the vehicle? 
A No. He never did find one. 
Q Did that raise any concerns in your mind? 
A Yes, sir. 
Q What was that? 
A Well, while he was looking for that, it 
was quite obvious that he was nervous. His hands 
were trembling more so than the general motoring 
public. 
That aroused my suspicion, and the fact he 
couldn't find a registration, and the fact that he 
called him Bill and couldn't give me a last name 
of the subject either. I was suspicious the 
vehicle was stolen. 
Q You indicated there was a passenger in 
the vehicle. 
A Yes, sir. Mr. McNaughton was in the rear 
seat. 
Q After-- Did you inform Mr. Ziegleman why 
you had stopped him? 
A Yes, sir. I would have, yes, sir. 
Q And after he wasn't able to produce a 
registration, what then did you do? 
A I started asking him questions like: 
Where are you going? Apparently they were going 
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back to Minnesota. 
And I said, " You're going back home?" And 
he said " Yes". I said, " Where have you been?" 
" California". " What did you do down there?" 
And at this time Mr, McNaughton had involved 
himself in the conversation. He was sitting in 
the right rear seat away from me. And the rear 
window of the left side was rolled down only three 
or four inches. 
And he quickly came over to that, tried to 
talk to me through the window. And he quickly 
rolled the window down and then he moved back to 
the other side. He was obviously nervous. He was 
doing everything quickly, abrupt, and trying to 
answer the questions I had for him. And he really 
showed his nervousness there. 
Q Did you make any further inquiries of 
them at that time? 
A I just asked several things: If they had 
any weapons in the vehicle, any drugs or 
narcotics, anything to make them as nervous as 
they appeared to me. 
Q What was their response? 
A Driver claimed he didn't have knowledge 
of anything of that sort. 
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Q And what then did you do? 
A I followed that up and said, " Do you 
mind if we look?" Deputy Thompkins was riding with 
me at the time. And he was on the passenger side 
of the vehicle. 
Q That is Deputy Bill Thompkins of the 
Sheriff's Department? 
A Yes, sir. 
And I said, " Do you mind if we look?" And 
the driver himself said, " No, sir. Help 
yourself. " The driver was very polite. Always 
using " Yes, sir" or " No, sir". 
Q After Mr. Ziegleman had indicated that 
you could search the vehicle, what then did you 
do? 
A I believe he opened the door and removed 
himself. I instructed him to stand behind the car 
out of the lane of traffic. And I asked Mr. 
McNaughton to step out. And he removed himself 
from the vehicle, and I motioned him to the back 
there so he'd be out of traffic as well. 
And at the same time I asked him what his 
name was, and he just grabbed his wallet and 
started digging through his wallet. And I was 
watching him as he was going through his wallet. 
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He was so nervous. His hands were going fast. 
And as he was doing that he passed over what 
appeared to be his driver's license, not only 
once, twice, but a third time. I finally stopped 
him and said, "Isn't that it right there?" 
And that's when he quickly went for it and 
tried to get it out. And when he did that, all 
the contents of his wallet had fallen on the 
ground. He was really nervous. 
Q After you had had this conversation with 
Mr. McNaughton concerning his name and the 
driver's license, what then did you do? 
A Well, like I say, after Mr. McNaughton 
was going through his wallet, I asked him what 
makes him so nervous. And he claimed he doesn't 
come in contact with the police that much. 
Apparently that's what he was trying to imply made 
him nervous. 
So I just started a search of the vehicle. 
And I immediately located a package of Zig Zag 
rolling papers in the Nike court shoe in the back 
seat. 
Q I hand you what's been marked as 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 2. 
Have you seen that before? 
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A Yes, sir. These are the rolling papers 
that I indicated were in the Court shoe. 
Q Do they have any use in the controlled 
substance area? 
A Typically they're used to roll marijuana. 
Q Did you make any inquiries as to who they 
belonged to? 
A I asked both of them, and neither one of 
them claimed it. However, Mr. Ziegleman claimed 
his shoes later. 
0 What then did you do after you found the 
Zig Zag papers? 
A I continued the search. 
And I couldn't understand why neither one of 
them would claim the papers, whereas they're not 
really illegal to possess. And I thought that'd 
just go along with why they were nervous. 
But I continued to search. And in the trunk 
I just asked them to identify the bag. And the 
driver identified a duffle bag. And I asked him, 
" Do you mind if I look in here?", indicating the 
bag. And he said, again, "No, sir. Go ahead. " 
1 looked in there and there was nothing 
located in there. So I just continued that 
search, and eventually I opened the motor 
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compartment underneath the hood. 
And all this time that I was doing this 
search both subjects wouldn't take their eyes off 
of the car. They were both really intent on 
watching the car. But as soon as the hood was 
opened, both of them turned around and looked 
away. 
Q When you opened the hood area what did 
you observe? 
A I was looking in the hood area and 
wondering why-- Usually when they look away like 
that you're in a warm spot. 
I started looking real close. And all I 
could see was an oily rag between the right 
quarter panel and the battery. It was actually 
down in the quarter panel behind the metal--
they're cutouts-- metal cutouts. And it was 
sitting behind that. And the battery was sitting 
next to it. 
So eventually I worked my way over there and 
pulled the oily rag off of that. And I could see 
a brown grocery sack. And I could push down on 
that. And it wasn't an oil can or an oil 
container of any sort. 
Q Did you then remove that? 
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A Well, it was in a tight spot. And I 
pushed it back. It was similar to cocaine 
packages I had seen before. 
Q It had a shape similar to a kilo of 
cocaine package? 
A Yes, sir. 
Q From your past training and experience 
have you found controlled substances-- and 
especially with respect to cocaine-- concealed in 
hood areas before? 
A Yes, sir, I have. 
Q Did you then remove the item that you 
observed? 
A Not right then. I couldn't-- Like I 
said, it was kind of hard to get out of there. 
I just pushed it back to get a good idea what 
it was, and then we handcuffed the subjects. And 
then we went back up, removed it from where it was 
at. 
Q You placed them under arrest prior to 
removing it? 
A Yes. Yes, sir. 
Q And show you what's being marked as 
PLaintiff's Exhibit No. 1, and ask if you could 
identify the items contained therein? 
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A No. It's better to use-- We're talking 
probably two different things. 
Q Okay. 
A If we're going the opposite way, this 
radar doesn't allow you that kind of capability. 
But once you're behind it, and as I was pacing it, 
sure, I would have used the speedometer. But I 
would verify it with the radar. 
Q So if-- Let's say you had sufficient 
information to stop and issue a citation. You 
would have done it with your visual estimate, your 
speedometer and your radar gun, typically; is that 
correct? All three; is that correct? 
A In a pacing situation, yes, sir. 
Q But the second two failed you because, in 
your opinion, I-- I believe that's what you 
stated. In your opinion, he had slowed down; is 
that correct? 
A Yes . 
Q So what you did then was you pulled up 
along side of him. And were you-- Let's say your 
driver-- or your window-- front passenger window 
along side of his front window--
Is that the idea? So you were right even 
with him? 
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A Yes. Even. 
Q And how long would you say you were like 
that? 
A Quite awhile. In fact, I did it twice. 
I went up once and looked, and he wouldn't look. 
And I could see that there was a passenger in 
there. I backed back there, went back again. And 
I thought, " Just look over so I can motion for 
you to slow down." But he wouldn't look over. So 
we probably did that. It probably took us-- Oh, I 
don't know. It was within a mile there. 
Q A mile? 
A Within a mile. Somewhere in there. 
Q So maybe about a minute, if you were 
traveling about 60 miles-an-hour? 
A Yeah. 
Q And his speed didn't vary during that 
period of time that you noticed? 
A He was going like 60 at that time. 
Q Did you honk or anything else to get his 
attention? 
A I don't recall honking. 
I do remember they were both-- it appeared to 
me-- both consciously trying not to look at me. 
Almost like they were guilty. So they were both 
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looking straight ahead. 
Q You felt they might be acting as if they 
were guilty? 
A There's no doubt about it. My feeling is 
they were just acting guilty. Otherwise the guy in 
the back would have still been asleep. 
Q Officer, I have to ask you: What were 
they acting like they were guilty of? 
A It was obvious they wouldn't look over. 
They didn't want to look over at me. 
Q Did they act-- Does a drug r u n n e r -
Does a person who's guilty of drug running act a 
little different type of guilty than a person 
who's guilty of just murdering his wife or just 
speeding or something else, or do they all act 
guilty, in your opinion? 
A Well, they act nervous. These two were 
obviously nervous, yes, sir. 
Q Officer, have you ever stopped anybody in 
your entire life who wasn't nervous about being 
stopped by a police office? 
A Oh, yeah. They don't display any 
nervousness. They could be, but they don't show 
it . 
Q Do you notice any large amount of 
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difference between people who are, quote, guilty 
of something, and those who aren't in their amount 
of nervousness? 
A Without fail, yes, sir. 
Q And in your opinion, that is a good thing 
to look for as an estimate that they're guilty of 
something? 
A Probably the best one, yes, sir. 
Q So when you stopped him-- you pulled 
behind him and stopped him-- it was because they 
looked guilty; is that correct? 
A No, sir. 
Q Why did you stop them? 
A For speeding. I couldn't even get their 
attention. 
Q Did you cite them for speeding? 
A I think they were issued a warning 
citation, yes, sir. 
Q Do you have anything in writing that 
shows that? 
A Yes, I do. Here it is right here. 
Q Did you find such a thing? 
A Yes . 
MR. MCCULLOUGH: May I approach? 
THE WITNESS: Sure. 
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Q (BY MR. MCCULLOUGH) But now, correct me 
if I'm wrong, Officer, if they had looked over at 
you, you would have given them a hand signal to 
slow down, and that was it; is that correct? 
A That's probably what it would have 
amounted to, yes, sir. 
Q Okay. 
What would it have taken-- guilty looks 
aside, what would it have taken, differently from 
what you saw, to stop him without any hesitation 
about your stopping him? 
In other words, you looked for a reason this 
time not to stop him, but you didn't find it, 
apparently. What would it have taken, in your 
opinion, to come up behind him and stop him 
without looking for an alternative? 
A If I had confirmed it. That speed would 
have come up on the radar. It would have been 
definitely a citation. 
Q But if, in fact, he had not looked 
guilty, you would not have done anything other 
than to tell him to slow down; is that correct? 
A No. I couldn't get their attention. They 
were obviously not looking at me. 
Q Is that or is it not the indication that 
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you just gave us of his looking guilty, Officer, 
the fact that he refused to look at you? 
A He wouldn't look at me. 
Q Is that what you just identified as a 
look of guilt? 
A Yeah. But the question you asked me was 
if he--if he would have looked guilty, would I 
have let him go. 
If he had just simply looked at me, I would 
have motioned him down. He wouldn't do that. 
Q But if he had looked at you with a guilty 
look, you would have still stopped him? You would 
not have stopped him if he'd looked at you with a 
guilty look? 
A No, because I would have been able to 
motion him to stop. 
Q So it was his lack of looking at you that 
made you stop him; is that correct? 
A Yes . 
Q And you did that because the lack of 
looking at you meant something to you suspicion 
wise; is that correct? 
A That heightened my suspicion why they'd 
be so nervous not to look at me, yes. 
Q Did you have any particular suspicion at 
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that time that he may have been guilty of some 
particular thing; murdering his wife, stealing the 
car, cheating at Las Vegas when he came through, 
anything in particular? 
A Yes. Speeding. 
Q Speeding? 
A Yeah. 
Q Okay. 
But you didn't have enough evidence to do 
anything more than give them a warning? 
A I wouldn't have done it, no. 
Q So when you stopped him, Officer, did you 
intend to just give him a warning and let him go, 
or were you looking for something else? 
A I'd have told them to slow down and let 
them go. 
Q What was it about his behavior or about 
either of their behavior or the situation that 
changed your mind into a search situation? 
A Several things. 
First of all, the way Mr. Ziegleman's hands 
were trembling; the fact that they couldn't give 
me any vehicle information other than that 
insurance card, and the fact that Mr. McNaughton 
was as nervous as he was. 
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Q All right. Let's talk about the vehicle. 
Is it unusual for a person to be driving a 
vehicle other than is in his own name? 
A It's unusual-- not necessarily driving 
them, but the passenger isn't one of the-- or the 
owner isn't one of the passengers, or something of 
that sort. 
Q Now, you say you've made 75 drug arrests 
out there in the last year or so. What percentage 
would you say were driving somebody else's car? 
A Of those kind of drug arrests, felony 
drug arrests? Probably-- what percentage were 
driving their own car or even had the passenger? 
Probably 30. 40. 30 may even be high. 30 
percent. 
Q So the fact that they were in someone 
else's car heightened your suspicion? 
A Yes . 
Q Did you know-- They gave you the name of 
an owner from an insurance paper; is that correct? 
A Yes, sir. 
Q And obviously you had access to the 
license number. 
Are you able to use that information to get a 
stolen vehicle report or anything? 
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A Yes, sir. 
Q And did you attempt to do so? 
A Oh, yes, I would have, yes. 
Q And what was the finding? 
A It was negative. 
Q All right. 
From your experience, Officer-- And you've 
been on the force about three years; is that 
right? 
A About four years now. 
Q How long would it take someone-- let's 
say in Minnesota-- who had noticed his car was 
missing to get it on to like an N.C.I.C. or an 
interstate situation so you could pick it up? 
A I don't know Minnesota's laws. 
California it takes two days or something like 
that before they put it on. 
Q But if somebody goes out and simply sees 
their car gone, it's quicker? 
A Yeah, if they don't have any information 
as to who would have stolen it. 
Q So in other words, it doesn't take a long 
time for a stolen vehicle report to come up to a 
degree where you can pick it up on your machine; 
is that correct? Doesn't take long. A couple of 
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days at the outside? 
A If, in fact, it had been reported and if, 
in fact, the officer turned it in. 
Q Would you say, then, Officer, that-- You 
indicated earlier that you had some suspicion the 
vehicle was stolen. 
At what point did you form that suspicion? 
A When he couldn't come up with any papers, 
being nervous like he was, and that he offered a 
name of William and Bill. But he didn't provide a 
last name, as I recall. He provided me the name 
of Bill. 
Q Did you-- He did show you some 
identification of owner? 
A Eventually he came up with what was kind 
of an insurance application is all. 
Q Were you ever able to-- or did you make 
an attempt to-- in later searching or reviewing 
contents of the vehicle-- find any ownership 
papers in there? 
A No, sir. 
Q Did you make any attempt to? 
A I don't recall actually searching that 
just to find the owner. But we did have this 
insurance information. I think we called it in 
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1 and confirmed that he was a registered owner, if I 
2 remember right. 
3 Q And you also called in right at the scene 
4 to determine if there were any stolen vehicle 
5 reports on it; is that correct? 
6 A That would have been done eventually. I 
7 don't know at what point. 
8 Q Are you able to do that from your car 
9 radio? 
10 A Yes. 
11 Q And do you get the report back from your 
12 dispatcher or whatever fairly quickly? 
13 A Yes, sir. 
14 Q And you probably would have done so then 
15 at the scene; is that correct? 
16 A Yes. It would have been done at the 
17 scene. 
18 Q And what was the result of that test or 
19 that check? 
20 A That N.C.I.C. inquiry was negative. 
21 Q Would that be some indication in your 
22 mind, Officer, as to whether or not the vehicle 
23 was likely to be stolen? 
24 A Some, but not a hundred percent. 
25 Q What would you typically do to double 
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check on that, if anything? 
A Call the owner. 
Q Did you attempt to do that? 
A I believe I did at the office. 
Q And did you get any reply? 
A I can't recall specifically on this 
case. But I do it as a rule. And if I did get a 
reply, then the reply was that they did have 
permission to have it. 
Q Suppose, Officer-- once again, for the 
sake of argument-- that you hadn't found anything 
in the car in your subsequent search. Would you 
still have been suspicious despite the lack of 
N.C.I.C. report, so on, enough to hold on to these 
people and take them down so you could phone the 
owner? 
A Typically in that situation, I would have 
the dispatcher call the registered owner. 
Q Suppose you weren't able to get somebody 
at home. And apparently you weren't able to. 
A Sometimes that happens. You have to 
weigh the totality of the circumstances and see if 
it's worth detaining them and how long it's worth 
detaining them. 
Q And you would have had to make a decision 
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at some point as to whether or not to let them go 
or to hold on to them for further investigation? 
A Right. 
Q However, what you did was-- because of 
the head movements, and the hand movements, and 
the lack of vehicle identification, and so on, you 
formed suspicion that something else might be 
going on; is that correct? Is that a fair 
assessment? 
A Something was going on. That something 
was going on, yes. 
Q So it was based on all of those things 
that you asked them for permission to search the 
vehicle? 
A Yes, sir. 
Q Anything else that I've left out that 
figured in your reason for asking for permission 
to search the vehicle? 
A Not that I can recall, no, sir. 
Q Officer, you were asked the question on 
direct examination if they-- either of them had 
any written permission from the owner. 
In all the cars you've stopped who have 
belonged to somebody other than the person in the 
car, have you ever seen anybody who does have 
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written permission? 
A Yes • 
Q What kind of percentage? 
A Probably a smaller percentage. Maybe 30, 
40 percent, 
Q Have you ever borrowed anybody's car, 
Officer? 
A Yes . 
Q Have you ever gotten written permission? 
A No, sir. 
Q Would it ever occur to you? 
A I've never traveled very far in anyone 
else's car• 
Q It wouldn't have occurred to you, though, 
would it? 
A If I was going across the state, yes, it 
would have. Not just in the city. 
Q Is that the reason it occurred to you, 
because of your police training or whatever, or 
because it would be easier or what? 
A Going out of state? 
Q Yes . 
A For the same reason. 
Q At any rate, everything that happened 
that we've gone through up until now made you 
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decide that you wanted to search the vehicle; is 
that correct? 
A Yes, sir. 
Q So you asked for permission, you got it 
from the driver, and you started to look; is that 
correct? 
A Yes • 
Q And now, you indicated that had Mr. 
Ziegleman was cooperative. 
Did he act in any manner unusual to you when 
you asked him for permission? 
A Only that he was really polite. That 
seemed unusual. But that could be his own 
demeaner. Yes, sir. It was a little unusual. 
Q What is the typical person who you stop 
and want to investigate do when you ask them a 
question like that? 
A They're like, " Sure. Go ahead." Or, 
" Help yourself." Or, " No, sir. " " Yes, sir. " 
It's a little--
Q It's a little too polite? 
A Yeah. 
Q And that affected you in some manner? 
A Not really, no. 
Q Suppose, Officer, I were to tell you that 
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a person you were asking happened to have a mother 
who's a Deputy Sheriff. Would that, do you 
suppose, have affected his politeness to a Deputy 
Sheriff or a Highway Patrolman? 
A I don't know whereas that would make him 
any more polite. 
Q Do you have a son, Officer? 
A No, sir. 
Q How about the other sons of the other 
members on the force? Are they polite to you? 
They probably like--
A Friendly. 
Q They probably like police. 
A Right. 
Q Unlike defense attorneys. 
Did his politeness make a difference to you 
in level of suspicion or anything? 
A It could be an indicator, you know. 
Overly polite is kind of a sign they may be as 
nervous as-- Well, that could be his own 
demeaner. I never really made a distinction on 
that. 
Q You indicated that first he stared 
fixedly at the car, and then turned. I think ycu 
indicated as you got warmer or-- I believe I can 
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quote i t. 
" Usually when they look away like that 
you're in a warm spot". 
A Yes . 
Q How usually? You say you've made 75, 100 
arrests of felony matters. 
How usually out of those 75? 
A Probably every time. 
Q Every time? 
A I would say-- that may be high. But it 
would be in the high 90's if it wasn't every time, 
Q So it's your experience that the closer 
you get to stuff you start seeing necks jerk; is 
that right? 
A You see some obvious display of 
mannerisms that would be different than what they 
had been displaying up until that point. 
Q And the difference in mannerisms to you 
was a turn of the head? 
A No. They turned around. 
Q Physically turned? 
A Yes. Looked away, yes, sir. 
Q And in uniform-- I mean, I get the 
impression from your testimony it was almost like 
they were lock stepped, that somebody had 
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about-faced them. Is that--
A I've seen that happen. But this isn't 
exactly like that. They just turned away. 
Casually moved themselves and looked away. 
Q Casual gesture? 
A They casually turned around. But they 
were obviously looking away, yes. 
Q Did you notice the height-- a heightened 
amount of nervousness or anything like that that 
you could--
A To that point it's almost an indication 
that they concede or something. 
Q That they concede what? 
A That we're going to find it. 
Q Did you know what you were looking for by 
then, Officer? 
A By that time, we had come to the 
conclusion something was wrong, and whether or not 
it was a stolen vehicle or it was a drug courier. 
Q When you say " we", you were with a 
Deputy Sherrif; is that right? 
A Yes, sir. 
Q Did you have occasion to chat with him, 
caucus with him, anything, when you come up with 
the "we"? 
Lesley Nelson, C.S.R. 
784 East Skylark Drive 
Spanish Fork, Utah 84660 (801) 798-2868 
46 
A Yes • 
Q How did that occur? 
A When we were searching the car we made 
the statement, " There has to be somebody here. 
Look at the way they're acting." Just that kind 
of discussion. Both of us-- Each time we'd say 
that we'd indicate that, "affirmative." There had 
to be something wrong. 
Q Where were the defendants standing while 
you were making the search? 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
place? 
A 
Q 
Between the cars. 
And officer-- was it Thompson? 
Thompkins. 
Thompkins ? 
Yes . 
He assisted you in looking through the 
Yes, he did. 
Neither of you were back at the back of 
the car kind of keeping an eye on them or 
anything? I guess there was no place for them to 
go much, was there? 
A No, not really. 
Q So he was up in the front of the car 
assisting you ? 
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A We moved around. I'd be in the front, 
he'd be in the back. 
Q And where was he when you opened the 
trunk-- or the hood? 
A I don't recall. Oh. When I was under 
the hood, he was up in the passenger compartment 
Q Still looking inside the passenger 
compartment? 
A Yes . 
Q Now, you testified that-- and you were 
shown what was marked Exhibit No. 2, which are 
some Zig Zag rolling papers. You said you found 
those in a shoe that you later identified as 
belonging to Mr. Ziegleman. 
A Yes, sir. 
Q You said that they were sometimes used 
for rolling marijuana? 
A Yes, sir. 
Q You didn't find any marijuana? 
A No, we didn't. 
Q They're also sometimes used, I assume, 
for rolling tobacco? 
A Yes, sir. 
Q You didn't find any tobacco either? 
A No. 
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Q Are you claiming anything particular for 
the rolling papers, Officer? Are they evidence of 
anything in your mind? 
A In my mind, yes, sir, they are. 
Q Of what? 
A I couldn't understand why they wouldn't 
claim them. 
Q And that, once again, added to 
suspicions; is that correct? 
A Yes. Suspicions, yes. 
Q But that was well after you had commenced 
your search; is that correct? 
A Shortly thereafter, yes. 
Q Now, Officer, when you asked to search, 
you indicated they were polite. 
Did you in any manner indicate to either of 
the defendants that they were free to go as an 
exception, like I can search this or you can go 
and not let me search it? Or did you give them 
any alternatives or any indication of what their 
alternatives might be? 
A No, sir. 
Q You didn't also indicate that they were 
under arrest or anything at the time? 
A No, sir. 
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Q But perhaps-- Would it be fair to say 
that the impression was given that they were not 
exactly free to go at that point? 
A At what point? 
Q When you asked for permission to search 
the vehicle? 
A Would it be fair? 
Q That you were giving out the impression 
that they were not exactly free to say " no" and 
go home? 
A I don't know how they perceived that, no, 
s ir . 
Q Suppose, Officer-- once again for the 
sake of argument-- once again, you're still a 
little suspicious that maybe the vehicle could be 
stolen. Suppose they said, " No." Then what? 
A No to search? 
Q Yes . 
A Then I'd have gone back to my car, called 
in N.C.I.C. information; I'd determine whether or 
not it would be necessary to call the registered 
owner, and--
Q You would have had to make a decision at 
that point as to whether or not to hold on to them 
for further information or to let them go; is that 
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right? 
A Yes . 
Q You hadn't made that decision at that 
time because it wasn't necessary to make; is that 
fair? 
A Yes, sir, that's probably fair. 
Q When you found-- First of all, you 
searched the passenger compartment first; is that 
right? 
A Yes . 
Q And the trunk thereafter; is that right? 
A Yes, sir. 
Q And you got permission-- specific 
permission from Mr. Ziegleman to open his suitcase 
or duffle bag; is that right? 
A Yes, sir. 
Q And outside of rolling papers, found 
nothing in those areas, correct? 
A Right. 
Q Anything else in the car that we haven't 
talked about that affected in any manner your 
continued suspicions? 
A Nothing else other than rolling papers. 
Q Okay. 
Did the rolling papers, in fact, focus 
Lesley Nelson, C.S.R. 
784 East Skylark Drive 
Spanish Fork, Utah 84660 (801) 798-2868 
5 1 
suspicion on possible marijuana that you might be 
looking for or — 
A Yes . 
Q When you found this item under the hood 
did you find any information whatsoever under the 
hood that led you to believe that either of the 
specific defendants were in possession of that, 
other than the fact that they're all in the same 
car? Anything under there that said to you, 
" A-ha. This is Mr. Ziegleman's drugs or this is 
Mr. McNaughton's drugs" or--
A Only what I have indicated. Body 
language. Not any hard evidence. 
Q Would it be fair to say then, Officer, 
that the whole search was really as a result of 
body language? 
A No, not the whole search. No, sir. The 
whole basis for it was not just based on that. 
Q Well, let's say this, Officer: Suppose 
the vehicle had been stolen. What evidence could 
you hope to find in the vehicle of its being 
stolen? 
A Personal property of the owners. 
Q Is there some type of personal property 
that an owner might leave in a vehicle that he had 
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stolen rather than that he had let somebody 
borrow? Some kind of idea as to maybe what kind 
of personal property he might be looking for? 
A It's happened to me before where the 
owner left a bunch of personal property and--
including some of his awards and some personal 
clothing. Things like that. That's usually a 
good indication. 
Q If you had found those items, it would 
have heightened your suspicion of a stolen 
vehicle? 
A Absolutely. 
Q You wouldn't find those under the hood, 
though, would you? 
A No, sir. 
Q In fact, if you had been looking for 
evidence of a stolen vehicle it would have been 
confined to the passenger compartment and the 
trunk? 
A Yes, sir. 
Q And so by the time you opened the hood 
you were not looking for evidence of a stolen 
vehicle; is that correct? 
A Right. 
Q You were looking specifically for drugs? 
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A Yes, sir. 
Q Particularly for marijuana, or had you 
decided? 
A No. But based on the evidence, it would 
lead you to believe it could be marijuana, yes, 
sir. 
Q Let me just see if we can get this down 
to a few sentences, Officer. 
The incident occurred because, number one, 
you thought they were speeding and they slowed 
down; number two, they wouldn't look at you; 
number three, the vehicle belonged to somebody 
that wasn't in the vehicle; and number four, body 
language . 
Is that it in a nutshell, or is there 
anything else that contributed to the whole 
incident and your behavior on that incident? 
A You could probably put it in those 
categories, sir. 
MR. MCCULLOUGH: Thank you. 
THE COURT: Mr. Harmon? 
CROSS EXAMINATION 
BY MR. HARMON: 
Q Officer Bushnell, you have indicated that 
you had training on speed detection at the police 
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT . „ 
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UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
* * * * * * * * * * pal P. Greenwood.Clerk . Oep'Jty 
S T A T E OF UTAH 
Plaintiff, Case Number: 82-E 
vs. RULING 
BRENT ZIEGLEMAN AND MICHAEL GEORGE E. BALLIF, JUDGE 
MCNAUGHTON 
Defendants. 
********** 
This matter came before the Court on defendants' motions 
to suppress cocaine, which was found in the hood of a car 
defendants were driving. Defendant Michael John McNaughton filed 
his motion on August 26, 1991 and defendant Brent Ziegleman filed 
his motion on September 6, 1991. 
The Court, having proceeded with an evidentiary hearing and 
also having considered the motions and memoranda, now enters its: 
RULING. 
The Court denies defendants' motions in that the officer 
was justified in making the initial stop of the vehicle, he had a 
reasonable, articulable suspicion sufficient to detain defendants, 
and he obtained a valid consent to search to vehicle. In the event 
that either the initial stop or subsequent detention are flawed, 
then under a fourth amendment search and seizure analysis the issue 
of standing and of a reasonable expectation of privacy would arise. 
However, in this case defendants have not established that they had 
such an expectation, especially in the hood area of the vehicle. 
1. 
2. 
POINT ONE—THE OFFICER WAS JUSTIFIED IN MAKING THE INITIAL STOP 
The Utah courts have held that a police officer may stop 
an automobile for a traffic violation committed in his presence, 
State v. Sierra, 754 P.2d 972 (Utah App. 1988), and that an officer 
conducting a routine traffic stop may request a driver's license 
and vehicle registration, conduct a computer check, and issue a 
citation. State v. Robinson, 797 P.2d 431 (Utah App. 1990). In 
this case the officer, who was certified at estimating the speed of 
vehicles, believed that there had been a speeding violation. He 
testified that he attempted to warn defendants of this, but because 
they would not look at him, he pulled them over to relay this 
warning. 
It should be noted that if defendants' lack of eye contact was 
the cause of the initial stop for speeding, it was only due to the 
fact that the officer had been unable to warn defendant Ziegleman 
about his excessive speed by giving hand signals. This behavior 
did not, in and of itself, lead the officer to believe that there 
was more serious criminal activity going on. Although the officer 
considers nervousness and shifty eye movements as evidencing guilt 
in certain circumstances, those behaviorisms in the later part of 
this investigation only served to reinforce other findings as the 
investigation continued. 
POINT TWO—THE OFFICER WAS JUSTIFIED IN DETAINING DEFENDANTS 
SUBSEQUENT TO THE INITIAL STOP 
In Robinson, the Utah Appellate Court held that once an 
officer has obtained a valid driver's license and evidence of 
$7 
3. 
entitlement to use the vehicle, the driver must be allowed to 
proceed on his way. Here the driver, Brent Ziegleman, could not 
produce a registration for the vehicle, and the only entitlement 
to use the car was his claim that his friend "Bill" had loaned him 
the car. He could provide no further information about "Bill." 
In State v. Deitman, 739 P.2d 616 (Utah 1987) it was stated 
that an officer may seize or detain a person if the officer has an 
"articulable suspicion" that the person has committed or is about 
to commit a crime. Here, the officer has testified that he 
suspected that the car had been stolen. Therefore, he detained the 
defendants in order that he could check with NCIC to see if the 
car had been stolen. 
POINT THREE—THE OFFICER OBTAINED A VALID CONSENT TO SEARCH THE 
VEHICLE 
It is unclear from the facts whether the officer asked for 
consent to search the car while he was waiting for the results from 
NCIC, or whether he had already learned the car was not listed as 
stolen when he asked for consent. In any event, it is undisputed 
that Ziegleman replied, unhesitatingly, "help yourself." This 
seems to be voluntary consent and, in fact defendants have not 
alleged any police coercion or duress, but claim the search is 
invalid under a "fruit of the poisonous tree" analysis. However, 
the initial stop was valid, the subsequent detention was valid, 
and the contraband was discovered under the hood of the car 
pursuant to a valid consent to a search, and thus it is admissible. 
c/c> 
4. 
POINT FOUR—DEFENDANTS HAVE NO STANDING TO OBJECT TO A SEARCH OF 
THE HOOD AREA 
The foregoing analysis assumes that defendants had standing to 
object to the search, pursuant to a fourth amendment search and 
seizure analysis. However, in the event that the initial stop, the 
subsequent detention or the search were flawed in some manner, the 
issue does arise whether defendants had standing, or had a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in the hood area, to begin with. 
According to Utah case law, the legitimate expectation of 
privacy test is a fact sensitive and not a bright line test. State 
v. Grueber, 776 P.2d 70 (Utah App. 1989). In State v. Taylor, 169 
Utah Adv. Rep. 62 (Utah App. September 12, 1991), it was held that 
a defendant can have a legitimate expectation of privacy if he is 
the owner or is in possession of the property with the permission 
of the owner, and that "in order to be sufficient for fourth 
amendment purposes, a subjective expectation of privacy must be one 
society is prepared to recognize as reasonable." 
In this case, defendants admitted they were not the owners of 
the vehicle, could produce no registration for it, and could not 
produce evidence that permission had been given to them by the true 
owner to use the car. All they could say is that "Bill", about 
whom they could give no details, had loaned them the car. The only 
circumstance implying permissive use of the car was that they were 
in possession of the car. This is not sufficient to establish a 
reasonable expectation of privacy. 
Furthermore, even if defendants had such an expectation in the 
<?/ 
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passenger compartment of the vehicle, they most likely did not have 
a subjective expectation of privacy in the area under the hood of 
the vehicle. Pursuant to Taylor, this is certainly not an 
expectation that society would recognize as reasonable, when they 
were not the owners of the vehicle and have not established that 
they had the permission of the true owner to use the vehicle. 
Dated at Provo, Utah this \ H day of January, 1992. 
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cc: Donald J. Eyre, Jr. 
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W. ANDREW MCCULLOUGH (2170) 
MCCULLOUGH, JONES, & IVINS 
Attorneys for Defendant Ziegleman 
930 South State Street, Suite 10 
Orem, Utah 84058 
Telephone: (801) 224-2119 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF JUAB COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
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STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
BRENT ZIEGLEMAN and MICHAEL 
MCNAUGHTON, 
OBJECTIONS TO FORM OF 
PLAINTIFF'S PROPOSED 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW ON 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO 
SUPPRESS 
Case No. 82-E 
Defendants. 
oooOooo 
COMES NOW Defendant Brent Ziegleman and objects to the form of 
Plaintiff's proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law on 
Defendant's Motion to Suppress, as follows: 
1. Defendant Ziegleman has no objection to Paragraph 1. 
2. At the end of Paragraph 2, a comma should be inserted 
after the word "speeding" and the following phrase should be added: 
"and investigating suspicious behavior of the occupants, in 
refusing to look at him." 
3. Defendant Ziegleman has no objection to Paragraph 3. 
4. After the first sentence of Paragraph 4, should be added 
IcCullough, Jones, 
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the following phrase: "the driver was, however, able to produce an 
insurance paper indicating the name of the owner, William Kaylor." 
The following additional sentence should be inserted "It is not 
unusual to travel in a borrowed car without carrying written 
permission." 
5. The second sentence of Paragraph 5 should be rewritten as 
follows: "The request came back negative, but the officer 
continued to investigate the situation, because of the nervousness 
of the occupants, and his general feeling of suspicion raised by 
the circumstances." 
6. Defendant Ziegleman has no objection to Paragraph 6. 
7. Defendant Ziegleman has no objection to Paragraph 7. 
8. Defendant Ziegleman has no objection to Paragraph 8. 
Defendant Ziegleman has the following objections to the 
Conclusions of Law set forth by Plaintiff: 
1. A comma should be inserted after the word "estimate" in 
Paragraph 1, and the following phrase should be added: "and the 
refusal of the occupants to make eye contact with him". 
2. A comma should be inserted after the word "vehicle" and 
the following phrase should be inserted: "and upon the nervousness 
and 'suspicious' behavior of the occupants." 
3. Defendant Ziegleman has no objection to Paragraphs 3, 4 
and 5 of Plaintiff proposed Conclusions of Law. 
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DATED t h i s day of April, 1992. 
MCCULLOUGH, JONES, & IVINS 
C/(2tLs ft. 
W. Andrew McCullough 
Attorney for Defendant Zieglem 
I hereby certify that on the 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
day of April, 1992, I did 
mail a true and correct copy of the above and foregoing Objections, 
postage prepaid to Donald Eyre, Attorney for Plaintiff, 125 North 
Main Street, Nephi, Utah 84648 and Milton T. Harmon, Attorney for 
Defendant McNaughton, 36 South Main Street, Nephi, Utah 84648. 
IIKL aw IS 
zieglexian.obj 
£f 
Donald J. Eyre Jr., No. 1021 
Juab County Attorney 
125 North Main Street 
Nephi, Utah 84 648 
Telephone: 623-1141 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR JUAB COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, : FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
vs. : 
Criminal No. 82-E 
BRENT ZIEGLEMAN and : 
MICHAEL McNAUGHTON, 
Defendants. : 
The above entitled matter came before the Court for hearing 
upon the defendant's Motion to Suppress on November 15, 1991. The 
defendant, Brent Ziegleman, was present and represented by his 
attorney, W. Andrew McCullough, and the defendant, Michael 
McNaughton, was present and represented by his attorney, Milton T. 
Harmon. The State of Utah was represented by Donald J. Eyre Jr., 
Juab County Attorney. 
The Court having heard the evidence introduced by both the 
State of Utah and the defendants and having reviewed the Memorandum 
of Law submitted by the parties and being fully advised in the 
premises and the Court having previously entered its Ruling dated 
1 
?! DJutrlci Couti, Ju-t, C-unt 
January 14, 1992, now makes the following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. On July 20, 1991 on 1-15 within Juab County, Utah, Trooper 
Lance Bushnell, a four year veteran of the Utah Highway Patrol, 
observed a motor vehicle in the area of Nephi, and visually 
estimated the speed to be in excess of 70 m.p.h., approximately 75 
m.p.h., but was unable to obtain a radar reading on the vehicle. 
The officer had received training and certification in estimating 
of speeds. 
2. The officer turned and followed the vehicle to obtain a 
paced speed, but the vehicle had slowed and was now traveling 60 
m.p.h.. He then pulled alongside the vehicle with the intent of 
giving the driver a hand signal to slow down. Neither the driver 
nor the passenger would look towards him so he could signal them 
to slow down. The officer then stopped the vehicle with the intent 
of giving the driver a warning concerning his speeding. 
3. The driver of the vehicle was the defendant, Brent Lee 
Ziegleman, with one other passenger in the vehicle, the defendant, 
Michael McNaughton. 
4. Upon stopping the vehicle, the officer approached the 
driver and asked for a driverfs license and registration. The 
driver produced a driver's license, but was unable to produce a 
registration. The driver claimed the owner's name was "Bill" and 
2 
he was a friend and he had borrowed the car, but could give no 
further information concerning liis name or where he lived. While 
the driver searched for the registration, he appeared to be 
extremely nervous with the hands trembling. The occupants had no 
written authorization or anything that gave them the right to be 
in possession of the vehicle. 
5. The officer ran the vehicle through the NCIC computer to 
determine if it was reported stolen. The request came back 
negative, but the officer continued to investigate the possibility 
of a stolen vehicle, because of his past experience of finding 
stolen vehicles not listed on NCIC as stolen. 
6. The officer then asked the driver if there were any 
weapons, drugs or narcotics in the vehicle. The driver said there 
was not any. The officer then asked for consent to search, Mr. 
Ziegleman unhesitatingly replied "help yourself". 
7. The officer then searched the interior of the vehicle and 
found nothing of substance. The officer then asked for consent to 
search the trunk, which consent was again given by the driver. 
Again no contraband was found therein. The officer then search the 
hood area. Between the right front fender and the battery was an 
oil cloth covering a brown grocery sack with a kilogram of cocaine 
contained therein. 
8. Both defendants were then arrested for possessing cocaine 
3 
with the intent to distribute• 
Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact the Court makes the 
following: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The stop of the defendants' vehicle by Trooper Bushnell 
for speeding based upon his visual estimate was lawful based upon 
reasonable suspicion of a violation of state law. 
2. The continued detention of the defendants after the 
initial stop for speeding, was justified based upon the defendants 
inability to produce a registration for the vehicle or any 
authority to be in possession of the vehicle. 
3. The defendant, Ziegleman, voluntarily consented to a 
search of the vehicle by the officer without any coercion or duress 
by the officer. 
4. Neither defendant had a reasonable expectation of privacy 
to the hood area of the subject vehicle, and therefore did not have 
standing to object to a search of that area of the vehicle. 
5. Both defendants1 Motions to Suppress should be denied. 
Dated this 
I 
r c*. DLtrlct Court, Jjaii Cr»m*/ 
F I L £ P 
Mot/ ^ 
M rj. C. **» occ»\..r\ _ — i :r:_.y 
Donald J. Eyie UJL., HU. XU^.X 
Juab County Attorney 
125 North Main Street 
Nephi, Utah 84648 
Telephone: 623-1141 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR JUAB COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff, : 
ORDER DENYING DEFENDANTS1 
VS. : MOTIONS TO SUPPRESS 
BRENT ZIEGLEMAN and : Criminal No. 82-E 
MICHAEL McNAUGHTON, 
Defendants. : 
The above entitled matter having come before the Court upon 
both defendants1 Motions to Suppress for hearing on November 15, 
1991 before the Honorable George E. Ballif, sitting as Judge 
thereof. The defendant, Brent Ziegleman, was present and 
represented by his attorney, W. Andrew McCullough, and the 
defendant, Michael McNaughton, was present and represented by his 
attorney, Milton T. Harmon. The State of Utah was represented by 
Donald J. Eyre Jr., Juab County Attorney. 
The Court having previously entered its Ruling dated January 
14, 1992, and its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Defendants' 
1 
/CO 
Motions to Suppress are denied. 
Dated t h i s day of llA^ArJ? , 1992. 
£%u*-->g- A, an 
^/DistriHt Jud 
•/oy 
/oi 
• . i District Court, JbfbCcw:ty 
fMLED 
MAY 1 9 \i:i 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COU&tf- frcenweoc.Oe^ UcP"l' 
JUAB COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
********** 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
BRENT ZIEGLEMAN and 
MICHAEL McNAUGHTON, 
Case Number: 82-E 
RULING 
GEORGE E. BALLIF, JUDGE 
Defendant, 
********** 
The Court has considered the objections of the 
defendants7 to the State's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of law 
and said obejctions are overruled and the State's Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law are ordered filed herein. 
Dated this / J day of May, 1992. 
BY THE COURT 
GEORGE W. BALLIF, JUDGE 
cc: Donald Eyre 
Milton Harmon 
W. Andrew McCullough 
/ ^ 
